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Uncoupling
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone*
ABSTRACT
A series of Supreme Court decisions recognize the end of the federal–
state–corporate partnership that once provided a foundation for employment
security and family stability. That partnership, which reached its pinnacle
during the industrial era, established a family wage made available to the
majority of the male population through unionization, a social safety net that
filled the gaps left by wage labor, and the extension of these public and
private benefits to women and children through marriage.
Uncoupling shows how family security and stability can no longer be
linked to employment or marriage, requiring a redesign of the state response.
The Supreme Court has framed the necessary elements in that response.
First, although other scholars note that the Court’s marriage equality
decision in Obergefell celebrates marriage, this Article emphasizes that the
decision rejects the historical conception of marriage that made it
mandatory, gendered, and foundational to family security. Second, the
Court’s opinion in Little Sisters of the Poor in 2020 reaffirms the Court’s
earlier decisions that employers owe no civic obligations to their employees
or the public good and are thus inappropriate partners for the administration
of state benefits. Third, the Court’s ongoing decisions interpreting the
Affordable Care Act, including those pending during the upcoming Supreme
Court term, lend more support to direct state–citizen compacts than to
employment-based benefits.
What other legal scholars have yet to acknowledge is that these decisions
point the way toward the emergence of a new legal order. This Article’s
groundbreaking analysis of the rise and fall of the male family wage leads to
the conclusion that coupling—between men and women in marriage and
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between employers and state-sponsored benefits—no longer works, clearing
the way for the creation of a new legal order.
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INTRODUCTION
Cesar Ardon lives in Siloam Springs, a small town of about 17,000 people
in Arkansas, close to the Oklahoma border. 1 Mr. Ardon, who is forty years
old, worked as a welder for fifteen years. 2 Then doctors discovered a
baseball-sized tumor on his ribs. 3 Since the surgery to remove it in May 2017,
he has found occasional work as a handyman, but his pay and the hours he
works fluctuate each week with the number of jobs he can find. 4 Through
Medicaid, he was able to get treatment and care. 5 But then, in March 2018,
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) granted the State of
Arkansas a waiver from Medicaid requirements imposed under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA). 6 Under the AR Works Amendment, the state
could require Medicaid recipients to comply with work requirements in order
to continue receiving benefits. 7
In May 2018, the state notified Mr. Ardon that he was required to work at
least eighty hours a month if he wanted to keep his Medicaid coverage. 8 Not
only does Mr. Ardon have trouble securing eighty hours of work each month,
but he also has difficulty reporting the work he does through the Medicaid
website. 9 Yet, if he were to lose his Medicaid coverage, perhaps only because
1.
This description is based on the filings and opinions in Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93
(D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v. Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S.
Dec. 4, 2020); see SPLC Sues Trump Administration for Approving Arkansas Medicaid Work
POVERTY
L.
CTR.
(Aug.
14,
2018),
Requirement,
S.
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2018/08/14/splc-sues-trump-administration-approvingarkansas-medicaid-work-requirement [https://perma.cc/6RWB-UAT7]. The case had been set for
argument on March 29, 2021, but earlier that month, the Supreme Court removed the case from
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
its
docket.
Search
Results:
No.
20-37,
SUP.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/2037.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Z3-G2AU]; see James Romoser, Court Nixes Upcoming Argument
on Medicaid Work Requirements, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 11, 2021, 12:55 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/03/court-nixes-upcoming-argument-on-medicaid-workrequirements/ [https://perma.cc/F5H5-Y3NP].
2.
S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
“Medicaid establishes certain minimum coverage requirements that states must include
in their plans. States can deviate from those requirements if the Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] waives them so that the state can engage in ‘experimental, pilot, or demonstration
project[s].’” Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir.) (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; and
then citing 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)) (describing statutory framework), cert. granted sub nom.
Arkansas v. Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020).
8.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 144, 147, Gresham v. Azar,
363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-01900).
9.
Id.
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of a reporting glitch, he would have trouble paying for the health care he
needs to stay alive. 10
Five months after he received the notice, he became a plaintiff in a lawsuit,
claiming that the AR Work Amendment violates both the Constitution and
the Administrative Procedure Act. 11 The question of whether the ACA
permits work requirements, as expressed through Cesar Ardon’s challenge,
characterizes the clash between legal regimes that provide individuals
stability and security. 12 His story shows what happens when an old regime
begins to falter, but the terms of the new order have not yet come into place.
We are at such a moment today, and we believe that the story of the
ongoing litigation underlying the ACA can be told in such terms. While
others have addressed how the ACA has transformed the country’s approach
to health care, 13 this Article shows that the ACA litigation goes far beyond a
story about health insurance. Instead, this Article is the first to bring together
the ACA litigation with other Supreme Court decisions to show not just the
collapse of the regime providing family security and stability but also the
nascent development of a new one. 14
The old regime, which arose to meet the needs of the industrial era, rested
on three pillars: secure, long-term employment paying a male “family wage”;
the extension of these benefits to women and children through marriage; and
the design of social insurance to fill in the gaps left by the first two. 15 A series
of Supreme Court decisions has recognized and in some cases has accelerated
the end of the federal–state–corporate partnership that once provided the
elements of that system and a foundation for family security. 16 Large
corporations no longer provide secure employment or comprehensive

10. S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 1.
11. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 96.
12. As this article was finalized in early March 2021, it appeared that the Biden
administration would repeal the waivers at issue in Gresham. Romoser, supra note 1. Regardless
of the ultimate outcome of work requirements, the issues at the core of the case show the
disintegration of the old regime for providing family security and stability.
13. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment,
108 GEO. L.J. 495 (2020) (describing ACA litigation); Andrew Hammond, Litigating Welfare
Rights: Medicaid, SNAP, and the Legacy of the New Property, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 361 (2020).
14. Other scholars discuss the changes in employment, see infra Part II, and marriage, see
infra Parts II.A and B, but not the implications of these changes for redesign of the state of both
sets of changes for a new state order.
15. See discussion infra Part I.
16. These decisions, of which Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020), is simply a recent iteration, recharacterize the role of
corporations, unions, and citizens in the constitutional order. See infra Part III.

53:001]

UNCOUPLING

5

benefits for a large portion of the population.17 Marriage is no longer the
compulsory institution for childrearing, with just under 40% of American
children born outside of marriage. 18 And a social safety net premised on
marriage and employment can no longer meet families’ needs. 19
Within this context, the provision of health care became a flash point. 20
The old system assumed that employers would provide health insurance
covering most employees, and that only supplementary services for the
elderly (Medicare), the poor (Medicaid), or dependent women and children
required government involvement. 21 By the time President Obama proposed
the ACA, however, very few of the assumptions on which this system was
based remained true. Employees, even if they have secure jobs, switch jobs
more frequently than they once did. 22 And more workers cycle in and out of
the labor market. 23 While married couples have two adults who might be able
to secure employer-provided family health coverage, unmarried parents may
have only one adult who can do so, contributing to the overall decline in
employer-sponsored health care coverage. 24 And Medicare and Medicaid, at
least as originally conceived, did not cover these gaps. 25
The federal government’s attempt to address these changes produced the
ACA. The question of what the ACA stands for, however, is far from fixed.
17. See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE
HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY 122–24 (2016) (describing decline in the number of employees at
large corporations and the greater transience in the labor market more generally); id. at ix–xii
(describing change in the organization of work from “careers to jobs to tasks” (emphasis
omitted)).
CTR.
FOR
HEALTH
STAT.,
18. Unmarried
Childbearing,
NAT’L
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm [https://perma.cc/3BJ4-VK5V]
(Dec. 9, 2019).
19. See discussion infra Part I.A.
20. See generally Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13 (describing history of and reaction
to the ACA).
21. See discussion infra Part III.C. Consider the importance of covering pre-existing
conditions. Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance Market
and the Politics of “Choice,” 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 473, 479 (2007).
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.
23. See Nick Bunker, What’s Behind the Decline in Male Labor Force Participation in the
United States?, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (June 22, 2016),
https://equitablegrowth.org/whats-behind-the-decline-in-male-labor-force-participation-in-theunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/34E9-D559] (maintaining that the decline in labor market
participation reflects in part more time spent between jobs).
24. See, e.g., Matthew Rae, Daniel McDermott, Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, Long-Term
(Apr.
3,
2020),
Trends
in
Employer-Based
Coverage,
PETERSON-KFF
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/long-term-trends-in-employer-based-coverage/
[https://perma.cc/QCG5-DSUM].
25. Indeed, the original ACA recognized this gap by mandating Medicaid expansion to
cover those with incomes up to 138% of the poverty line. Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13,
at 545.
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The ACA can be seen as a band-aid, covering the gaps left by a system that
relies principally on employer-provided (and tax-subsidized) private
insurance. 26 Medicaid expansion, in turn, can be characterized as a federal–
state partnership in which administration of such programs is best
decentralized. 27 The ACA, however, can also be characterized as something
else altogether—the first step in a new social compact that remakes the
relationship between citizen and state in fundamental ways.
This Article positions the ongoing litigation over the ACA, ranging from
the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Gresham to the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Little Sisters of the Poor, within the context of the changing terms of family
security and stability. Our argument is that the economy of the information
age has dismantled the industrial-era system that tethered family security to
the male family wage, long-term employment, and stable marriage,
disguising the state role in securing family well-being. 28 The new system
decouples the relationship between employment and family security,
marriage, and women’s intrinsic dependence. 29 In the process, it undermines
the premises of New Deal era social insurance in which benefits were tethered
to marriage and long-term employment. 30 The fights over the ACA provide
signposts defining what the terms of the new regime are likely to be. 31
26. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 683–85 (2014) (recognizing
corporations as no more than instruments to advance the interests of their owners).
27. Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 498.
28. Orly Lobel has powerfully argued that “there is no natural exclusive link between social
welfare and employment.” Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor
Law, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 69 (2017).
29. See discussion infra Part II.A.
30. See discussion infra Part I.C.
31. The ACA remains under challenge. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 949 F.3d 182 (5th
Cir.) (alleging that now that the individual mandate has been eliminated, it can no longer be
justified by the taxing power), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar.
2, 2020) (No. 19-840), and cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2,
2020) (No. 19-1019). The national political discussion, however, has already shifted to the need
to provide universal health care. A new plan, designed to overcome the obstacles the Supreme
Court put in the path of the ACA, is likely to be more firmly tied to the principle of uniform
national coverage than the ACA itself. Indeed, the easiest way to extend universal health care is
through Medicare for all, in part because new legislation could simply build on the existing
Medicare structure, a long-standing arrangement whose constitutionality is firmly established.
See, e.g., Miles Mogulescu, Conservatives and Liberals Agree: Medicare for All Would Be
Constitutional, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2012), https://pnhp.org/news/conservatives-andliberals-agree-medicare-for-all-would-be-constitutional/ [https://perma.cc/EE2P-E4S5]. While
the Biden–Harris platform calls, instead, for a public option, that option may over time ultimately
lead to the further erosion of employer-provided health care, ultimately severing the link between
health care and employment altogether. See, e.g., Susannah Luthi, Why Employers Are Flirting
(Feb.
10,
2020,
12:55
PM),
with
the
Public
Option,
POLITICO
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This Article considers the interrelationship between marriage, work, and
economic benefits. It introduces the terms “decoupling” to describe the
changes that make tying family security to marriage and employment
ineffective and “uncoupling” to describe the redesign of a system that no
longer makes marriage or long-term employment conditions for access to
individual security and autonomy. In other words, “decoupling” is the
dismantling of the older system, and “uncoupling” is the design of benefits
that do not depend on either marriage or employment. 32
Part I sets up “coupling,” the normative framework for the state–corporate
partnership that provided family stability and individual security. It describes
the development of the family wage, explaining how this reinforced female
dependency. It then turns to the origins of the state-based social insurance
system, in which benefits were tied to ability to work and familial
connections to the worker. Part II shows how economic changes have
decoupled family security and stability from marriage and employment. Part
III explores how the system that secures family stability can be uncoupled
not just from marriage but also from long-term employment—and from the
assumptions that arose from the male family wage of the industrial era. This
then means changing the relationship between the individual and the state. 33
I.

COUPLING: THE RISE OF THE FAMILY WAGE

To understand the insecurity underlying today’s family requires
examining the corporate–state partnership that provided economic stability
for much of the twentieth century. That system depended on the forces
producing a male family wage, a gendered division of family labor, and a
social insurance system tied to the notions of desert associated with marriage
and employment. That story starts with the American self-image that ours is
a middle-class country. 34 At the center of this ideal is the belief that those
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/08/employers-health-care-public-option-112380
[https://perma.cc/8R7S-4MUP]; Christina Wilkie, Biden Puts Health Care Front and Center with
a
Call
To
Expand Obamacare, CNBC
(Nov.
10, 2020, 5:53
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/10/biden-presses-for-expanding-obamacare-even-as-s.html
[https://perma.cc/7TP8-H752].
32. “Employment” here refers to employment at any given time with a particular employer.
33. See also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Economic
Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 375 (2018) (noting that “many constitutional
democracies . . . are actively considering, and passing, measures to increase investments in
education and training, raise the minimum wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income”).
34. The middle class can be defined to include “people . . . who are prepared to make
sacrifices to create a better life for themselves but who have not started with life’s material
problems solved because they have material assets to make their lives easy.” John Parker,
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who acquire the right assets, observe the right values, make the right
investments, and form the right families for themselves and their children can
enjoy a better life. 35 For that to be true, however, families must have access
not just to the means of subsistence but also to a surplus that allows them to
invest in their own and their children’s futures. 36
At the time of the country’s founding, the United States could think of
itself as a relatively egalitarian country because the principal source of family
security, stability, and surplus lay with land ownership—and land in the
United States, unlike Europe, was readily available. 37 The families of the
colonial era rested on three pillars: an effective male monopoly on access to
land ownership; land ownership as a prerequisite to marriage, at least for
white men; and the marriage-defined homestead as a source of family,
stability, and security. 38
Burgeoning Bourgeoisie, ECONOMIST (Feb. 14, 2009), https://www.economist.com/specialreport/2009/02/14/burgeoning-bourgeoisie [https://perma.cc/Q226-A5ZC] (quoting Brazilian
economist Eduardo Giannetti da Fonseca). At the time of its founding, the United States was more
egalitarian than Europe because of the lack of an entrenched aristocracy. Infra note 37 and
accompanying text. And in the early days of the Republic, 90% of the population lived on farms,
with farm ownerships relatively available in comparison with Europe in the same time period.
Infra notes 37, 43 and accompanying text. The concept of a “middle class” between wealthy
capitalists and an unskilled working class is nonetheless thought of a creation of the industrial
age. See generally STUART M. BLUMIN, THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS (1989).
35. Parker, supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. See BLUMIN, supra note 34, at 108–09 (describing the United States’ self-image as an
“egalitarian republic”); MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 5 (G. Edward White ed., 1985) (referring to novel
circumstances in the New World including the availability of land). These descriptions, however,
were never true of the South. The South, even looking just at whites, was much more radically
unequal than the North; it resembled “extractive” colonial cultures in a way the North never did.
See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL 351–57 (2012). At the
beginning of the nineteenth century, over ninety percent of African-Americans in the United
States were enslaved people. See Aaron O’Neill, Black and Slave Population of the United States
from 1790-1880, STATISTA (Feb. 12 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1010169/blackand-slave-population-us-1790-1880/ [https://perma.cc/GPF7-5BD6]. And freed blacks often
faced discrimination and limits on their ability to own land, depending on the area of the country.
See, e.g., Macarty v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 240 (1848) (holding that given the antimiscegenation laws, an African-American woman had no claim to the property of her partner but
could keep the property that was the result of her own efforts). In addition, even for whites, the
South was a more stratified society and grew increasingly so over time. “In 1850, 17 percent of
the farming population held two-thirds of all acres in the rich cotton-growing regions of the
South.”
The
South’s
Economy,
DIGIT.
HIST.,
https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3558
[https://perma.cc/
4N9A-3XDL].
38. While women could own property during this period, their husbands gained the right to
manage the property when the women entered into marriage. Richard H. Chused, History’s
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The Industrial Revolution and the urbanization that accompanied it
destabilized that regime. It involved a wholesale shift from farm production
to wage labor as the principal source of family support. 39 Wage income,
however, was intrinsically less stable than farm production. 40 In the early
years of the Industrial Revolution, it increased family vulnerability to
economic downturns, injuries, and premature deaths. 41 Moreover, by
enlisting men, women, and children in factory labor, it undermined the basis
for human capital investment that provided the pathways into the middle
class. 42
This section describes the creation of the male “family wage” as the
solution that, by the middle of the twentieth century, created pathways into
the stable middle class for the majority of working-class white families. This
system rested on coupling family security with a male monopoly on access
to the “good jobs” in the new industrial order, recreating women’s
dependence within marriage, and extending access to these benefits in the
middle of the twentieth century through social insurance, unionization, and
labor market regulation.
A. The Agrarian Family Safety Net
In 1800, the family farm served as the primary source of security and
stability for American families. Ninety percent of Americans lived on
farms, 43 and the farm-based families of the era were described as “little
commonwealths.” 44 They were hierarchically organized, self-sufficient,
interdependent households, 45 with all members contributing to their
economic viability. The security they provided rested on male property
Double Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 2213, 2215
(1994) (explaining effect of coverture). On race, see generally Eleanor Brown and June Carbone,
Race, Property, and Citizenship (2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (providing
historical context on the pathways of Blacks into the middle class).
39. Hilary Land, The Family Wage, 6 FEMINIST REV. 55, 56–57 (1980).
40. Id.
41. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, How Did Industrialization Alter the Family, FOUNDS. OF W.
CULTURE:
THE
INDUS.
REVOLUTION,
http://foundations.uwgb.org/family/
[https://perma.cc/6BKK-6VMY].
42. Id.
43. Beth
Waterhouse,
A
Sustainable
Future?,
PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/ktca/farmhouses/sustainable_future.html [https://perma.cc/K33P-8DTN]
(stating that 90% of the U.S. population lived on farms in the nineteenth century).
44. GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 4–5 (citing JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH:
FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY, at x (1970)).
45. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 964–
65 (1993). “This ‘little commonwealth’ of family life was public not only in the economic sense,
but as the phrase implies, in the full political sense as well.” Id. at 965.
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ownership as the foundation for marriage, patriarchal administration of the
farm economy to address the subsistence needs of its residents, and restriction
of the alternatives in ways that made marriage compulsory for childrearing
and a permanent source of support for dependents. 46
Well into the nineteenth century, the role of government, whether federal
or state, was limited. 47 Instead, the family served as a basic unit of production
and community. 48 Farm households produced products for domestic
consumption and, perhaps, for sale, complementing any commercial crops
they might have grown with hunting, fishing, garden plots, and animal
husbandry. 49 Farmwives made their own clothes; farm parents trained their
children in the agricultural methods and crafts necessary to sustain an
agricultural economy. 50 The farm economy, which principally consisted of
subsistence farms that provided for their residents with minimal surpluses,
effectively provided its own social safety net, which extended to the young,
the comparatively few elderly (at a time of shorter lifespans), the disabled,
and the dependent. 51
Domestic relations were governed in accordance with English common
law. A man’s land ownership 52 signaled readiness for family formation, and
principles of coverture treated the husband as head of the family, with the
power to administer all of the family’s resources, including any separate
property the wife may have owned before the marriage or income she
received during the union. 53 In return, the husband had a duty to support the
46. See GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 5 (describing the household as patriarchal and women
and children as subordinate and dependent); id. at 235 (identifying paternal authority with
property ownership); id. at 200 (describing how “bastardy law” sought to ensure birth within
marriage).
47. Id. at 17–18.
48. Id. at 4–5 (describing comprehensive roles of families).
49. Dailey, supra note 45, at 966 n.25 (stating that before the nineteenth century, most farms
involved cooperative economic activities whether production was for subsistence or sale).
50. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, supra note 41.
51. Indeed, in 1850, 75% of those over the age of sixty-five lived in multigenerational
families compared to fewer than 20% in 1975. Steven Ruggles, Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: The
Transformation of American Families, 1800-2015, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1797, 1798 fig.1 (2015); see
also GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 5 (describing dependents as subject to the authority of the
patriarch).
52. Those who could not afford to own land, those unwilling to move, and those freed after
the Civil War might instead become tenant farmers or sharecroppers. See Charles C. Bolton,
Farmers Without Land: The Plight of White Tenant Farmers and Sharecroppers, MISS. HIST.
NOW
(Mar.
2004),
http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/228/index.php
[https://perma.cc/G63F-AS78].
53. Coverture involved a complicated system that treated marriage as the union not just of
husband and wife but also of two different family lines administered in the context of a system of
male descent. See, e.g., Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139, 2150
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wife, while the wife was expected to provide domestic services. 54 Divorce
was legally difficult and rare; 55 if the couple separated, the husband would
typically retain the farm while the wife had limited means of support and few
places to go. 56 The husband’s legal authority over the household was thus
deeply entrenched. Indeed, the law of domestic relations was combined, in
treatises of the period, with the laws of master and servant. 57
B. Coupling: Industrialization and the Rise of the Family Wage
Ideology
While traditionalists like to present the marital family as timeless and
enduring, 58 the change from an agricultural economy to an industrial one
undermined family security, requiring a reorganization of family roles—and
ultimately a greater role for the state. 59 With industrialization, commercial
production moved out of the household and into factories and offices. 60
Urbanization separated family households from food production, creating
greater reliance on market economies. 61 Wage labor replaced property
ownership as the primary source of support for urban families, with the farm
population falling to 40% of the American public by 1900. 62
(2019); Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 174 (2014) (explaining how women’s
lack of control even of property held in their names made the husbands’ support critical).
54. Tait, supra note 53, at 179.
55. See, e.g., Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2015)
(observing that the southern states did not adopt judicial divorce until after the Civil War).
56. At death, farmland typically passed to the sons, who cared for the dependent widow.
The widow’s dower interest prevented the sale of the farm without her consent, but it entitled her
to only a one-third life interest. On inheritance patterns, see Richard H. Chused, Married Women’s
Property and Inheritance by Widows in Massachusetts: A Study of Wills Probated Between 1800
and 1850, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 42, 47–49 (1986).
57. See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 104 (John M. Gould ed., 14th
ed. 1896) (“The primary and most important of the domestic relations is that of husband and wife.
It has its foundations in nature, and is the only lawful relation by which Providence has permitted
the continuance of the human race. . . . It is one of the chief foundations of social order.”);
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Breaking Down Status, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2021).
58. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 689–90 (2015) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (citing
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 41
(2002)).
59. For a discussion of the expanded role of the state, see infra Part I.C.
60. Land, supra note 39 (describing movement of production into factories).
61. See Dailey, supra note 45, at 966 (describing how “productive work previously
performed within the family was removed to the outside workplace”).
62. Although 60% of the population still lived in rural areas. JAYSON L. LUSK, MERCATUS
CTR., THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE USDA IN THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 7 (2016),
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The new system increased economic inequality and made family security
more precarious. The rising middle classes, starting in the Northeast before
the Civil War, set the new standard: the husband, often employed in the
professions, finance, or the managerial ranks, 63 could earn enough money in
the paid workforce to support a family. 64 His wife supervised “a remade
domestic realm shorn of productive activities such as clothes making or bean
picking,” which enabled middle-class families to invest more in the education
and moral instruction of their young. 65 This model identified the family’s
middle-class status with the careful selection of the right marital partners who
could couple a husband’s middle-class earning capacity with the wife’s
ability to cultivate middle-class education and values. 66
At the beginning of the industrial era, however, this model was beyond the
reach of the working class, who moved into the factory jobs of the new era. 67
These families could not afford to keep women and children out of the labor
market, 68 often because the men did not make enough to support the family
on their own or because the men’s jobs were too insecure. 69 An injury or
layoff could threaten the family’s livelihood. 70 And economic downturns
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Lusk-USDA-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EAG-KBCH]; see
also Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1800–03 (describing transformation from property-based wealth
to wage labor).
63. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, supra note 41.
64. See, e.g., MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA
COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 184–85 (1981).
65. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 925, 945
(2015) (book review) (describing the much younger ages of marriage and lesser emphasis on
education in working-class families).
66. RYAN, supra note 64, at 185.
67. Id. at 153 (describing how the immigrant working class in the Northeast supplied the
factory labor in the new economy, with children going to work at young ages).
68. See Martha May, The Historical Problem of the Family Wage: The Ford Motor
Company and the Five Dollar Day, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 399, 401 (1982) (explaining that at the
beginning of the industrial era, wages for unskilled male labor were rarely enough to support more
than a single person); Ileen A. DeVault, Family Wages: The Roles of Wives and Mothers in U.S.
Working-Class Survival Strategies, 1880-1930, 54 LAB. HIST. 1, 1–3 (2013) (describing how
women filled in economic gaps).
69. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pleck, A Mother’s Wages: Income Earning Among Married Italian
and Black Women, 1896-1911, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
490, 490–515 (Michael Gordon ed., 3d ed. 1983) (describing how African-American families
preferred to have the wives work so the children could stay in school while Italian immigrant
families sent the children to work at early ages so the wives could remain home).
70. The (Fascinating) History of Workers’ Compensation Insurance, PIE INS.,
https://pieinsurance.com/blog/workers-comp/the-fascinating-history-of-workers-compensationinsurance/ [https://perma.cc/Y6RP-T6KW] (“[I]n 1913 alone, more than 25,000 employees were
killed in work-related accidents and about 700,000 were seriously injured. Considered the first
type of social insurance in the United States, workers’ comp provisions were adopted rapidly.
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could result in large-scale unemployment. 71 Women and children filled in the
gaps. 72 Particularly during economic downturns, family “disorganization”
increased. 73 Working-class families were often locked in poverty; they lacked
the means to invest in themselves and their children’s future. 74
Over time, however, the union movement sought to secure the benefits of
the middle-class family model for a larger part of the country. An important
part of its strategy involved the fight for the family wage. 75 The idea of the
family wage, which began in the United States in the mid-nineteenth
century, 76 involved two concepts as the key to societal stability: gendered
family roles and gender-segmented labor markets.
The first concept, gendered family roles, involved the ideology of
domesticity, which recreated female dependence through the design of
gender-differentiated family roles. 77 This model assigned men the obligation
to secure sufficient income to support the family and charged women with
responsibility for home and children. 78 The agrarian family had hierarchical
roles; men and women might work side-by-side, but the women were subject
to their husband’s authority. 79 The industrial family designed complementary
ones; husbands’ breadwinning moved to the market while wives received a
Thirty-six more states followed suit before the close of the decade. In fact, by 1921, only six states
had not authorized compensation for workplace injuries,” with Mississippi, the last state, doing
so in 1948 (footnotes omitted)).
71. In 1931, Wisconsin adopted a comprehensive labor code; it had earlier been the first
state in the nation to enact unemployment compensation. Shirley S. Abrahamson & Elizabeth A.
Hartman, Building a More Perfect Union: Wisconsin’s Contribution to Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 677, 689.
72. Land, supra note 39, at 57 (describing how “initially the whole family went into the
factory”).
73. During the Great Depression, for example, marriage rates declined, the number of
children placed in settings outside their families increased, and while divorce rates fell, desertion
rates increased. Dennis Bryson, Impact of the Great Depression on Family and Home,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/economics/encyclopedias-almanacsENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
transcripts-and-maps/family-and-home-impact-great-depression [https://perma.cc/J8R9-JJ6N]
(Feb. 16, 2021).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Lilach Lurie, Unions and Unequal Pay: The Establishment of the “Family
Wage,” 157 INT’L LABOUR REV. 153, 156–57 (2018) (describing how unions pushed for the
creation of the family wage in the period before the development of the welfare state).
76. May, supra note 68, at 401.
77. See Dailey, supra note 45, at 967 (describing the gender ideology of the separate
spheres).
78. Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213, 252–
53 (2017) (describing welfare state model built on a model of “separate spheres,” in which women
performed caretaking at home while men engaged in paid labor outside the home); see also May,
supra note 68, at 403 (distinguishing between middle-class domesticity and working-class
concerns about survival).
79. GROSSBERG, supra note 37, at 4–5 (describing patriarchal authority).
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limited form of authority in the home, now shorn of its commercial role. 80
The rise of the family wage reinforced the importance of marriage as both
men and women gained status from gender-differentiated marital roles. 81 The
male family wage thus united male success with female dependence as
critical to the attainment of middle-class status. 82
The second concept underlying the fight for the family wage was
reinforcement of gender-segmented labor markets. At the beginning of the
industrial era, working-class men, women, and children often went off to the
factories together—although, even then, the jobs were typically sexsegregated, and the women paid substantially less. 83
The Supreme Court accepted the gender differentiation on which the
system rested. In 1905, the Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York
famously struck down a law that limited the maximum hours an employee
could work on the ground that such laws violated freedom of contract. 84 Three
years later, in Muller v. Oregon, the Court upheld a similar law. 85 The
difference was that the Oregon law only applied to women. 86 Men, according
to the Court, had the right to enter into onerous employment contracts if they
chose. 87 On the other hand, women’s “physical structure and a proper
discharge of her maternal functions—having in view not merely her own
80. See Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work,
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2001) (describing the change in the male
role “from patriarch to breadwinner”). This authority takes the form of what Reva Siegel labels
as “preservation-through-transformation.” Reva B. Siegel, ‘‘The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as
Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2119 (1996).
81. See Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1798, 1800 fig.3 (2015) (indicating over 90% of women
married by their mid-forties from the early 19th century through the 1970s, but that the number
has steadily fallen since then).
82. See May, supra note 68, at 401–02 (referring to a man’s ability to spare his wife from
“the drudgery of the cotton mill” (quoting Heidi Hartmann, The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism
and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, CAP. & CLASS, Summer 1979, at 16). But
see Land, supra note 39, at 57 (describing the change in female roles as one “from partners to
parasites”).
83. Univ. of Wis.-Green Bay, Women’s Roles in the Industrial Revolution, FOUNDS. OF W.
CULTURE:
THE
INDUS.
REVOLUTION,
http://foundations.uwgb.org/womensroles/
[https://perma.cc/ECD8-2DMC] (describing women’s wages as half to a third of what the men
were paid). Another source notes that the “ratio of female to male earnings, adjusted for time
inputs, increased from about 0.35 in 1820 for manufacturing workers, to 0.45 in 1890 for all
workers.” Claudia Goldin & Solomon Polachek, Residual Differences by Sex: Perspectives on the
Gender Gap in Earnings, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 143, 143 (1987).
84. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
85. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908).
86. See Melissa Murray, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Century in the Making, 43
HARBINGER 91, 92 (2019) (pointing out this distinction).
87. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60–61 (dismissing the notion that “the legislature, in its paternal
wisdom . . . [has] the right to legislate on the subject of, and to limit, the hours for such labor”
that jeopardizes worker health).
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health, but the well-being of the race—justify legislation to protect her from
the greed as well as the passion of man.” 88 The conservative Court of the
Lochner era was only too happy to embrace the precepts of the middle-class
family system that identified women’s proper place as in the domestic
sphere. 89 The same Court, however, rejected the use of state power to make
the middle-class model more accessible to working-class men. 90
The success in winning a family wage, at least before the New Deal, 91
came more from employers’ actions than from legislation. 92 In 1914, Henry
Ford became the first to adopt such a policy; economists have found that
Ford’s five-dollar day wage, double the norm at the time, resulted in
“substantial queues for Ford jobs” and “significant increases in Ford
productivity and profits.” 93 As Ford explained when doubling the rate paid to
married men, “[T]he man does the work in the shop, but his wife does the
work in the home. The shop must pay them both.” 94
Ford’s competitors eventually followed suit. 95 They did so because Ford’s
higher wages gave Ford Motor Company a competitive advantage. 96 The
88. Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
89. Murray, supra note 86, at 93 (concluding that, in the Court’s view, women needed to be
protected “when they ventured from their proper place in the domestic sphere into the rough and
tumble of public life and the marketplace”). In contrast, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a minimum wage for women in the twenties when the arguments justifying it were too close
to those justifying similar measures for men. See Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556
(1923) (striking down a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women), overruled in part
by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
90. Kimberly R. Willoughby, Mothering Labor: Difference as a Device Towards Protective
Labor Legislation for Men, 1830-1938, 10 J.L. & POLS. 445, 475–76 (1994) (describing how the
Adkins briefs placed less emphasis on male–female differences than those in Muller).
91. The same thing is true for child labor. See Celeste Corlett, Impact of the 2000 Child
Labor Treaty on United States Child Laborers, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 713, 716 (2002).
Congress had initially passed child labor laws in 1916, but the Supreme Court struck them down.
Id.
92. At least initially, many unions relied more on private bargaining to create higher wages
for unionized jobs rather than pushing for a higher minimum wage. Willoughby, supra note 90,
at 472.
93. Daniel M.G. Raff & Lawrence H. Summers, Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?, 5
J. LAB. ECON. S57, S57 (1987).
94. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 737
(2012).
95. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S83 (“By 1928, before the United Automobile
Workers had become an important factor in the automobile industry, wages were almost 40%
greater than in the rest of manufacturing.”).
96. As Henry Ford himself said,
There was . . . no charity in any way involved. . . . We wanted to pay these
wages so that the business would be on a lasting foundation. . . . [W]e were
building for the future. A low wage business is always insecure. . . . The
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major industrialists of 1914 depended on a large labor force. 97 Yet, factory
jobs, particularly with the introduction of Ford’s assembly line, were low
paid, onerous, and boring. 98 The manufacturing system of the era was plagued
by “low morale, turnover rates and aggressive union agitation.” 99 In 1913,
turnover at the Ford plant reached an annual rate of 370% and absenteeism
had become chronic. 100 Ford changed the dynamic through four measures.
First, the “family” wages he offered were higher than workers could earn
elsewhere, winning their loyalty. 101 Second, Ford Motor Company developed
services that benefitted employees’ families, including housing, playgrounds,
school, libraries, and hospitals. 102 Third, the company reined in frivolous or
arbitrary dismissals, encouraging employees’ expectations that they could
enjoy a long career at the company. 103 Finally, Ford coupled eligibility for the
higher wages with character requirements, enforced by a “Socialization
Organization.” 104 Organization representatives would visit the employees’
homes to ensure that they avoided social ills such as gambling and
drinking. 105 Men were deemed ineligible for the higher wages if their wives
worked outside the home. 106 Women employees rarely had access to the

payment of five dollars a day for an eight-hour day was one of the finest costcutting moves we ever made . . . .
HENRY FORD IN COLLABORATION WITH SAMUEL CROWTHER, MY LIFE AND WORK 126, 127, 147
(1922).
97. Indeed, Ford Motor Company’s labor force increased from 450 employees in 1908 to
14,000 employees in 1913. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S61–S62.
98. Id. at S63–S64.
99. Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 532 (2001).
100. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S63.
101. See Tim Worstall, Opinion, The Story of Henry Ford’s $5 a Day Wages: It’s Not What
(Mar.
4,
2012,
12:28
PM),
You
Think,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/03/04/the-story-of-henry-fords-5-a-day-wagesits-not-what-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/J3XY-2S6C] (emphasizing the role of higher wages in
securing employee loyalty).
102. Stone, supra note 99, at 532.
103. Id.
104. Worstall, supra note 101; Kashann Kilson, Henry Ford’s Dumbest Ideas Matter
Because His Smart Ones Changed the World, INVERSE (June 6, 2016, 6:30 AM),
https://www.inverse.com/article/16307-henry-ford-s-dumbest-ideas-matter-because-his-smartones-changed-the-world [https://perma.cc/S396-33WK].
105. See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How To
Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517, 530
(2001) (detailing Ford’s oversight of his employees at home and at work); Jonathan C. Lipson,
Promising Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1143 (discussing
how employers monitored workers in both public and private environments).
106. Worstall, supra note 101.
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family wage, though the company held out potential eligibility for women
who were single and supporting a family. 107
The changes at Ford laid the foundation for a new social system that
redefined the sources of family security and entry to the middle class. Factory
work, particularly work on an assembly line for low wages, did little to
enhance male status. The head-of-household role, especially when coupled
with membership in an elite club with higher pay (Ford Motor Company),
conferred substantially greater status. Ford tied that status to marriage and the
breadwinner role. 108 Male success depended on making marriage work, 109 and
women in turn gained status from pairing with a successful man—the
blue-collar worker of the industrial era gained a more respected social role. 110
Employers in turn gained greater employee loyalty and productivity; with
longer job tenures, employers also invested more in training employees in
company-specific skills. 111 The above-market wages, particularly for the less
skilled, made it less appealing for employees to quit and go elsewhere. 112 The
emphasis on the breadwinner role and family-oriented benefits attracted men
who needed the benefits to be able to maintain their “rightful” place as heads
of their households 113 and would be subject to family as well as employer
pressure if they shirked their obligations. 114 Over time, the increased wages
107. Id.
108. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate
Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 82 (2015) (discussing the
expectation that Ford employees get married).
A worker was eligible for the Five Dollar Day only after he had been at Ford
for six months, and had to fall into one of three categories: “All married men
living with and taking good care of their families”; “all single men, over
twenty-two years of age,” of “proven thrifty habits”; and men under the age of
twenty-two years of age, and women “who are the sole support of some next
of kin or blood relative.”
May, supra note 68, at 413.
109. See May, supra note 68, at 413.
110. For example, Marlon Brando’s character in A Streetcar Named Desire represented the
rise of working-class male status. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 13 (2014).
111. Stone, supra note 99, at 535, 538 (discussing the relationship between long-term job
tenure and employer investment in employees’ company-specific skills).
112. Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S65 (noting difference between skilled employees
and the unskilled).
113. Id. at S70 (observing that employers saw no need to include women in the family wage
program because they were less likely “to drink and fail to show up for work”).
114. See David Freeman Engstrom, “Not Merely There To Help the Men”: Equal Pay Laws,
Collective Rights, and the Making of the Modern Class Action, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1, 67 (2018)
(noting that activists argued that family well-being depended on the men’s ability to support their
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met not just the family’s subsistence needs but also facilitated the employee’s
ability to accrue savings, buy a house, meet emergency needs, and pay for
children’s education. 115 In short, like farm ownership in the agrarian era, the
family wage, premised on breadwinner–homemaker marriages, and coupled
with secure long-term employment, provided a buffer from hard times that
promoted family security and stability. 116 These benefits, however, which
started at Ford Motor Company as a way to keep out unions, would not extend
to most of the blue-collar workforce until the triumph of the union movement
during the prosperous era following World War II. 117 And private
employment, however generous, could not fully address the risks families
faced from illness, premature death, or the need to care for the elderly and the
disabled. Full realization of the promise of the new system would ultimately
depend not just on private actors but also a greatly expanded state role. 118
C. Complementing Coupling: Social Insurance Tied to Marriage and
Employment
By the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, the ideology of the separate
spheres, and with it, breadwinner–homemaker roles and the corresponding
celebration of the male family wage was well-established. The problem was
how to create family security for those who did not share in a family wage
paid to a male breadwinner. The Great Depression increased the challenges,
with manufacturing employment declining to 67% of its 1929 level by
1933. 119 The New Deal solution involved the design of social insurance at the

families); see also Land, supra note 39, at 64 (“There was—and is—evidence that men work their
longest hours when they have dependent children and that men with large families work longer
hours on average than men with small families.”).
115. May, supra note 68, at 401–02.
116. See Katherine V.W. Stone, A Fatal Mismatch: Employer-Centric Benefits in a
Boundaryless World, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 451, 453 (2007) (observing that the system was
“structured to bind the worker to the firm, thus reflecting and contributing to an emerging
employment system that valued long-term committed employees”).
117. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, LABOR’S LOVE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
WORKING-CLASS FAMILY IN AMERICA 90–119 (2014) (describing how blue-collar workers gained
in status, particularly in the era following World War II, and have lost ground since).
118. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1266–67 (2001)
(addressing the need for such a role).
119. Michael French, Effects of the Great Depression on Industry, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/economics/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/indust
ry-effects-great-depression [https://perma.cc/P7GN-YQFB] (Feb. 16, 2021).
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national level to complement wage labor and reinforce the necessity of
marriage. 120
In the thirties—as is true today—the debate over an expanded state role
involved ideological conflict. Those who supported laissez-faire policies
generally opposed state interference in the market, whether in the form of
greater market regulation such as the minimum wage or the abolition of child
labor, higher taxes to fund public initiatives, or direct provision of services. 121
At the same time, European countries were adopting more generous benefits
than the United States, and Franklin Roosevelt eventually embraced the
notion that society should guarantee positive socio-economic rights, such as
“freedom from want.” 122 The major New Deal provisions, although they
greatly expanded the governmental role, operated in a middle ground
between neoliberal and socialist ideologies: they embraced the concept of
social insurance designed to address increased risk. 123
Insurance generally involves the collection of premiums from a broad
group to compensate for losses that disproportionately affect the few. 124
“Social insurance” refers to “government programs that provide monetary
protection against risks associated with living in an industrial or
post-industrial society in which income typically derives from paid work.” 125
120. Employers, including the military, had begun providing various forms of pensions and
other types of social insurance in the nineteenth century. Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights,
Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 575, 579 (2009). And
“[b]etween 1911 and 1920, state legislatures in forty-five states passed workers’ compensation
laws.” Id.; see also Stone, supra note 116, at 456–57 (describing how the courts initially struck
down such laws).
121. See
Laissez-Faire,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
laissezfaire.asp [https://perma.cc/7655-N5SE] (July 23, 2020) (observing that “[t]he driving
principle behind laissez-faire . . . is that the less the government is involved in the economy, the
better off business will be—and by extension, society as a whole”); Ilana Waxman, Hale’s
Legacy: Why Private Property Is Not a Synonym for Liberty, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1009 (2006)
(linking laissez-faire thinking to the modern neoliberal ideology, including the Bush
Administration’s efforts to privatize social security).
122. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Annual Message to the Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 663, 672 (Russell & Russell 1969)
(1941) (including freedom from want).
123. See Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design
of Social Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 350
(2013) (explaining that while social insurance, like private insurance, “pools risks . . . social
insurance depends on government action . . . . designed to pursue societal purposes that could not
or would not be achieved through individual contracting in private insurance markets. Social
insurance is . . . . a different product . . . .”).
124. Id. (“‘Private insurance’ is composed of contracts to pool common risks so that
statistically predictable economic losses will be experienced as small subtractions from all insured
persons’ wealth rather than as calamities for an unfortunate few.”).
125. Weber, supra note 120, at 578.
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These benefits are distinguished from “charity” or “welfare” (or for that
matter, a broader social safety net) through their connection to work,
provision of benefits triggered by the occurrence of an event (e.g., old age or
injury) rather than need, designated sources of funding separate from general
tax revenues and often contributory in nature (e.g., payroll taxes), mandatory
participation (in part to avoid adverse selection), and legally determined
benefits. 126 At the same time, such programs are different from mandatory
savings programs or private pensions in that the benefits received may not
necessarily bear any correlation with the amount an individual contributes,
and Congress may alter the benefits in accordance with the program’s
purposes. 127
The Federal Social Security Act of 1935 has been called the “key
development in American social insurance,” 128 marking the adoption of
comprehensive national programs of old-age security and a federal-state
unemployment insurance program. As a national approach, the Social
Security Act rested on three principles: first, recognition that wage labor in
an industrial economy is intrinsically insecure, given the inevitability of
untimely deaths, injuries, illness, old age, and recessions; second, that an
expanded government role was the necessary and appropriate response; 129
and, third, that the programs were grounded in notions of merit and desert. 130
To vindicate these principles, Social Security mimicked private pension
funds and emphasized the idea that employees had “earned” their benefits
through the connection to work even though the program’s benefits never
corresponded in any precise way to an individual employee’s
contributions. 131 The program then extended these benefits to dependents
126. Id. at 578–80. Senator Walter F. George explained that: “Social Security is not a
handout; it is not charity; it is not relief. It is an earned right based upon the contributions and
earnings of the individual. As an earned right, the individual is eligible to receive his benefit in
dignity and self-respect.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 623 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
127. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 608–12 (describing congressional ability to take into account
such factors as the financial soundness of the program or whether a recipient could live in the
United States).
128. Weber, supra note 120, at 579–80.
129. See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1431, 1446–48 (1986) (discussing market failure rationales for federal insurance programs).
130. See infra notes 138–139 and accompanying text; see also Karen M. Tani, Flemming v.
Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property,” 26 LAW & HIST.
REV. 379, 397–400 (2008) (describing how differences between the majority and dissent in the
5-4 decision reflected the characterization of social security benefits as a property right). It is a
form of “social insurance,” designed to protect against lost wages based on death, disability, or
age. Nancy J. Altman, The Striking Superiority of Social Security in the Provision of Wage
Insurance, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 109, 114 (2013).
131. See Simon, supra note 129, at 1479–80 (estimating that about 70%
of Social Security payments “represented actuarially unearned transfers from younger workers”).
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through marriage, 132 replicating and reinforcing the family wage ideology
that had taken hold more generally. 133
Indeed, the Act’s origins can be traced to the federal pension system,
which had provided benefits to veterans throughout the nineteenth century. 134
Congress subsequently expanded the pension system to cover Civil War and
other military widows. 135 These programs, which required proof of marriage,
served as forerunners to the Social Security program. 136 The New Deal
architects, in 1935 and the subsequent 1939 Amendments, expanded
government benefits, tying eligibility to compensation for loss of a married
male breadwinner, albeit for a limited group of families. 137 The Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) program, which was something of an
afterthought to the social legislation, limited coverage to children under
sixteen who had been “deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of
a parent.” 138 Even then, the legislation gave the states leeway to add moral
character requirements that could be used to limit minority women’s access

132. Indeed, the estimates in the 1980s were that women received 54% of benefits while
paying only 28% of social security contributions because women lived longer, earned less, and
received more in the way of derivative benefits (that is, benefits calculated in terms of a spouse’s
or parent’s earnings rather than their own). Id. at 1482.
133. Linda Gordon, What Does Welfare Regulate?, 55 SOC. RSCH. 609, 614 (1988). In
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 283 (1979), the Supreme Court observed, in describing the
programs, that “the Government has taken increasingly upon itself the task of insulating the
economy at large and the individual from the buffeting of economic fortune.”
134. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism, Marriage, and Heather Gerken’s Mad Genius, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 615, 621 (2015).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 621–23. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN,
MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001) (providing
a history of social insurance for women based on marriage); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 427–
524 (1992) (comprehensive history of social insurance programs in the United States); Kristin A.
Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, and the Legal
Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1091 (2009) (noting the historically “central
role of marriage law in the development of social provision for women in the United States”).
137. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY
LAW 201–02 (2000).
138. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE 277 (1994). “After the enactment of Aid to Dependent Children in 1935, morality
requirements continued to exclude blacks; ‘man-in-the-house’ rules simultaneously discouraged
the formation of two-parent families while policing the behavior of single women.” Catherine J.
Ross & Naomi R. Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 55, 63–64 (1999).
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to benefits. 139 These restrictions remained in place through the 1960s. 140 The
ADC benefits, which were means tested, never gained the perceived
legitimacy of European family allowances, which extended benefits to all
children, 141 or the social security program with its links (however attenuated
in practice) to payroll taxes.
D. Completion of the Scaffolding: Unionization and Health Care
Overall, the expanded government role provided a measure of security for
those who coupled the good jobs of the industrial era with enduring
marriages. 142 The system reached its height during the period of relative
prosperity and economic equality that followed World War II. And the
expansion of family security and stability involved a de facto pact, with
government, unions, and private industry acting together to improve worker
well-being. The system was corporatist in nature, with government and
unions often acting through large corporations in ways that proved mutually
reinforcing. 143
This system rested on three elements. First, the Roosevelt Administration
had pushed labor legislation in 1935 that strengthened union ability to
organize and engage in collective bargaining. 144 Union membership grew
steadily after that and reached its height as a percentage of total employment

139. GORDON, supra note 139, at 277; CARBONE, supra note 137, at 201 (observing that
European nations provided child allowance to encourage more births to women of “native stock”);
see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563,
1569 (1996) (book review) (noting the United States focused on “the social control of poor
immigrant families and the neglect of Black women”).
140. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 202.
141. Id.
142.
New Deal legislation . . . sought to protect the family’s income against the
breadwinner’s loss of salary, creating a statutory scheme for unemployment
compensation in case of a lost job, and social security retirement when he
retired, as well as survivors’ and dependents’ benefits if he died. It also
supported women’s roles in homemaking and caregiving when there was no
functioning breadwinner.
Eichner, supra note 78, at 251 (citation omitted).
143. John Kenneth Galbraith describes the system as one of countervailing powers. JOHN
KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 196–
200 (1956).
144. The National Labor Relations Act, passed in 1935, guaranteed employees’ rights to
self-organization and collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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in the mid-fifties. 145 Second, with greater government support of labor, 146
corporate America reached a “concordat” that ushered in an era of relative
labor peace. 147 Third, labor and government both enhanced family security
by acting through corporations. 148
The result was a corporate-based welfare system. For example, while
unions in the early part of the twentieth century focused on improving wages
and working conditions, after World War II, they placed greater emphasis on
social insurance—often provided through private employers. 149 Katherine
Stone observes that from “1945 to 1970, the percentage of firms that offered
pensions grew from 19% to 45%.” 150 Union victories also made it harder to
fire employees and tied increases in wages, benefits, and job security more
closely to seniority. 151 This further enhanced the status of long-term
employees, increasing the disadvantages of women who took time out of the
labor market to raise children. 152
Perhaps the most emblematic aspect of this system involved health
insurance. The United States, unlike most of the developed world, has never
guaranteed universal health care to its citizens. 153 Instead, it created a
145. See Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Interests and Corporate Power, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1123,
1125 (2019) (“[B]y the mid-1950s unions represented over one-third of the American
workforce.”); GERALD MAYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
11
fig.1
(2004),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20040831_RL32553_e5e58e1832de83247c0883a6fd691b
c84691a745.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU22-69TV] (documenting trends).
146. See John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s
Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081,
1103–04 (2011) (maintaining that government intervention on labor’s behalf was “the most
critical, controversial, and divisive manifestation of governmental intervention to
promote countervailing power.”).
147. Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change,
and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
305, 322 (2013) (describing the agreement as one where corporate managers would be “left to
run their businesses as they saw fit, and, in return, labor unions received income and benefits
sufficient to carry their members into the middle class”).
148. Stone, supra note 116, at 454–55.
149. Id. at 459 (“[U]nions’ position on social insurance took an about-face during World War
II.”).
150. Id.
151. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden
Co., 47 MINN. L. REV. 505, 505 (1963).
152. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 116, at 460 (“The firm provided job security, training, social
insurance, and orderly advancement opportunities and obtained a loyal and knowledgeable work
force in return. The longer employees stayed on the job, the more their wages rose and their
benefits vested, giving them a greater stake in the firms over time.”).
153. Timothy Callaghan, 3 Reasons the U.S. Doesn’t Have Universal Health Coverage, U.S.
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016, 12:22 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/201610-26/3-reasons-the-us-doesnt-have-universal-health-coverage [https://perma.cc/Y68E-N8PL].
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patchwork quilt of programs built around employer-centered benefits. 154 That
system gained hold during World War II when employers sought to get
around wartime wage and price controls by offering a new benefit—health
insurance plans for employees and their families. 155 Following the war,
employers, who received generous tax treatment of the costs, expanded the
programs. 156 By 2010, employer-provided health insurance had become the
largest tax expenditure in the federal budget, with most employees having the
option of including family members in their plans. 157 Using tax subsidies to
finance private employer plans effectively disguised the substantial federal
role in ensuring health care availability.
Yet, precisely because the United States has refused to guarantee health
care as a right, the provisions never reached the entire population. 158 In the
sixties, the federal government dealt with seniors by directly financing
Medicare, a health insurance plan for those over the age of sixty-five, through
payroll taxes. 159 Spouses receive derivative eligibility through their
partners. 160 The less generous Medicaid program, in contrast, is administered
through the states and tied eligibility to need. 161 Over time, it would come to
cover a high percentage of the nation’s children, particularly those born to

154. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-Sponsored Health
Insurance and the Promise of Health Insurance Reform, 46 INQUIRY 187, 188 (2009).
155. See id. (“The link between employment and private health insurance was strengthened
during World War II when the War Labor Board ruled in 1943 that controls over wages and prices
imposed by the 1942 Stabilization Act did not apply to fringe benefits such as health insurance.”).
156. Id.
157. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019, at 28–42 tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857 [https://perma.cc/25C7-DYZ9].
Before adoption of the ACA, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was the
largest federal tax expenditure, with an annual value of $246.1 billion in 2007. David Gamage,
Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms
Are Needed To Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV.
669, 681 (2012).
158. In the mid-nineties, for example, 14% of children and 19% of adults lacked health
insurance coverage. SAMANTHA ARTIGA & PETRY UBRI, KAISER FAM. FOUND., KEY ISSUES IN
CHILDREN’S HEALTH COVERAGE 2 fig.1 (2017), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/keyissues-in-childrens-health-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/7DDX-EQ5J].
159. History of SSA During the Johnson Administration 1963-1968, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.ssa.gov/history/ssa/lbjmedicare1.html [https://perma.cc/6XGM-9B92].
SEC.
ADMIN.,
160. Retirement
Benefits,
SOC.
https://www.ssa.gov/benefits/retirement/planner/applying7.html
[https://perma.cc/F7CEZUKN].
161. What Is the Difference Between Medicare and Medicaid?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/answers/medicare-and-medicaid/what-is-the-differencebetween-medicare-medicaid/index.html [https://perma.cc/96MY-FXGA].
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unmarried parents. 162 Yet, many voters see Medicare, a federally
administered program, as a matter of right akin to Social Security, 163 while
Medicaid benefits remain less popular, less secure, and more subject to the
vagaries of state politics. 164
***
Industrialization began to take hold in the United States in the early part
of the nineteenth century. 165 The United States succeeded in bringing a
measure of stability and security to the families of the industrial age more
than a hundred years later. 166 Central to that security was the role of the male
family head, able to provide for a family because of the guarantee of lifelong
employment, with steady raises, ample insurance, and societal respect. 167
Male working-class income almost doubled, controlling for inflation,
between 1950 and the early seventies, and companies benefitted as
productivity increased along with wages. 168 Virtually everyone (94% of men
and 96% of women) married, with the average age of marriage falling
substantially in the post-war period. 169 Children were more likely to be raised

162. “For the nation’s youngest children, Medicaid and CHIP play an outsized role,
covering 45 percent of children under the age of six, compared to 36 percent of children between
the ages of six and 18.” ALISA CHESTER & ELISABETH WRIGHT BURAK, GEORGETOWN UNIV.
HEALTH POL’Y INST., MEDICAID’S ROLE FOR YOUNG CHILDREN 1 (2016),
https://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/MedicaidYoungChildren.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6MMN-XWSA]. CHIP involves a health care plan specifically tailored to ensure
coverage for children through Medicaid as well as a separate CHIP program, and it is administered
by
the
states.
Children’s
Health
Insurance
Program,
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/index.html [https://perma.cc/R4R4-P3ZE].
163. See Mollyann Brodie, Elizabeth C. Hamel & Mira Norton, Medicare as Reflected in
Public Opinion, 39 J. AM. SOC’Y ON AGING 134, 135 (2015), https://www.kff.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/generations-medicare-as-reflected-in-public-opinion-brodie-et-al.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2HT-6F4H] (stating 96% of the public views Medicare as important for the
public).
164. Data Note: 5 Charts About Public Opinion on Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb.
28, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/poll-finding/data-note-5-charts-about-public-opinionon-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/F2ND-YH2S] (showing a partisan divide in approval of
Medicaid). For a discussion of stereotypes of recipients of social assistance programs, such as
Medicaid, see Catherine Powell & Camille Gear Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls:
Race-Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, 108
GEO. L.J. 105, 109 (2020).
165. CHERLIN, supra note 117, at 1.
166. Id. at 85.
167. Id. at 92–93 (describing how the role of the father as sole provider and family head,
irrespective of occupation, still seems fulfilling and ennobling to many men).
168. Id. at 93.
169. Id. at 94–95.
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in a two-parent household than before or since 170 because death rates declined
and divorce rates, which had been rising since the Civil War, leveled off. 171
Wives described marriage in terms of greater security, comfort, stability, and
status that their unmarried friends envied. 172 This ideal was built on secure
jobs that, while they were not necessarily fulfilling, paid a male family wage
that enhanced the husband’s authority within the family and status among his
peers.
This system, even at its height in the postwar era, never benefitted
everyone. 173 The “good” industrial jobs were largely restricted to white
men, 174 and the New Deal legislation creating social insurance intentionally
excluded farmworkers and domestic workers, who were overwhelmingly
nonwhite, thus failing to reach those most in need. 175 Social insurance tied to
employment and marriage never sought to be universal; it did, however,
increase the stability and security associated with wage labor. 176
II.

DECOUPLING AND THE RETURN OF FAMILY INSTABILITY

Just as the industrial age destabilized the sources of stability in the agrarian
age, so too has the information age dismantled the family wage of the
industrial era. A growing academic literature describes the different
components—women’s greater economic independence and changing family
dynamics; the disappearance of high-paid manufacturing jobs for blue-collar

170. Id. at 115 (observing that it is the only period in which working-class families were able
to realize “the culturally potent ideal of the breadwinner husband and the homemaker wife, at
least during the years when they had preschool-age children at home”).
171. Id. at 99.
172. Id. at 100.
173. Id. at 116–17.
174. See id. at 87–88. African-American men, however, gained increased access, particularly
in the Northern states, in the forties and made some progress in the fifties. Id. at 87, 94.
175. See Simon, supra note 129, at 1442–43 (concluding that while the insurance state
“afforded an important degree of security to a substantial segment of the working class, . . . with
relatively dignified and secure employment and favorable working conditions and
compensation,” it left out “a relatively unorganized sector, with relatively low status, irregular
work, and unfavorable working conditions and compensation”). A substantial literature
documents the racism that contributed to these arrangements. See, e.g., Dorothy E.
Roberts, Irrationality and Sacrifice in the Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607, 2620
(1995) (observing that “Northern and Southern Democrats struck a deal that systematically denied
blacks eligibility for Social Security benefits, omitting federal eligibility standards and excluding
agricultural workers and domestic servants in a deliberate effort to maintain a black menial labor
caste in the South. Even Aid to Dependent Children was created for white mothers, who were not
expected to work.” (footnotes omitted)).
176. Simon, supra note 129, at 1140–41.
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men and the corresponding increase in economic insecurity and inequality; 177
and the decreasing ability of social insurance to provide an effective social
safety net, as fewer people have secure jobs or stable personal
relationships. 178
What no one has discussed, however, is the way that these elements
contribute not just to increased family insecurity but also to a change in the
dynamics of the entire system. The new system rewards those who manage
the human capital investments necessary to achieve labor market nimbleness
and family relationships based on flexibility, reciprocity, and trust—qualities
beyond the reach of much of the population. Seeing the changes in these
terms underscores the conclusion not just that the family wage system of the
industrial era is gone, but also that it cannot be resurrected. Neither long-term
employment nor marriage can work as a foundation for family security and
stability in the information age; they have become markers of success rather
than pathways to security.
A. Women and the End of Dependence
The move from an agrarian to an industrial economy did more than move
men’s labor out of the homestead. 179 It also commercialized domestic labor,
as sewing, candle-making, and other women-identified activities moved into
the market. 180 The service economy that arose in the middle of the twentieth
century accelerated the process. 181 Women’s labor market participation
started to grow in the fifties, with increased employer demand for services
women have traditionally provided, and then grew steadily through the rest
177. Indeed, it has only been in the last few years that social scientists have begun to accept
the relationship between the changing workplace and family organization. Compare WILSON,
supra note 58, at 156 (denying the role of economics in cultural change), and CHARLES MURRAY,
COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960-2010, at 204–12 (2012) (attributing
changes to the erosion of cultural values), with CHERLIN, supra note 117 passim, and David Autor,
David Dorn & Gordon Hanson, When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and the Falling
Marriage Market Value of Young Men, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 161, 163 (2019) (observing that “a fall
in the relative economic stature of men . . . reduces the prevalence of marriage” (emphasis
omitted)).
178. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET CRUSHED THE
AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) (2020) (calling for an improved safety net);
CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 101 (discussing how the role of employment instability
exacerbates family tensions).
179. See Melvin Kranzberg & Michael T. Hannan, Women in the Workforce, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-work-organization-648000/Women-in-theworkforce [https://perma.cc/9N7G-7DNP].
180. See id.
181. See id.
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of the twentieth century in a reinforcing series of steps. 182 Over the course of
these developments, women gained relatively greater economic
independence, resetting relationship terms. 183
The post-war economy increased market demand for women’s labor,
starting with clerical work, then expanding to teachers needed to fill the
classrooms of the baby boom generation, and eventually extending to a
greater need for medical personnel with the expansion of health insurance. 184
With greater prosperity, women’s education increased, with the number of
women attending college doubling in the sixties and increasing by another
50% in the seventies. 185
By then, the Civil Rights and Women’s Movements had taken hold. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed sex discrimination. 186 And the women’s
movement secured greater reproductive rights, allowing women to postpone
marriage and stay in school longer. 187 As more women entered the workplace
in the seventies and eighties, demand grew further for day care centers,
restaurants, dry-cleaning establishments, and other service industries that met
the needs of dual-income families. 188 The growth in service sector jobs
disproportionately increased the demand for women workers. 189 And
labor-saving devices (washing machines, dryers, and microwaves) made it

182. MITRA TOOSSI & TERESA L. MORISI, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WOMEN IN THE
WORKFORCE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION 1–3 (2017),
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2017/women-in-the-workforce-before-during-and-after-the-greatrecession/pdf/women-in-the-workforce-before-during-and-after-the-great-recession.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9L6Y-6ZVQ].
183. Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of wives employed outside the home rose from
58% to 75%. PAUL R. AMATO, ALAN BOOTH, DAVID R. JOHNSON & STACY J. ROGERS, ALONE
TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING 101 (2007).
184. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 231 (noting increased demand for women’s market labor).
185. See JUNE CARBONE, NAOMI CAHN & NANCY LEVIT, SHAFTED: THE FATE OF WOMEN IN
A WINNER-TAKE-ALL WORLD (forthcoming 2021) (on file with authors).
186. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
187. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730, 748–49 (2002) (linking
women’s greater graduate school presence to the ability to postpone childbearing).
188. AMATO ET AL., supra note 183, at 123–24 (describing how dual-income families became
better able “to afford services, such as high-quality child care, take-out meals, and home cleaning,
that help to ease the family burdens associated with dual employment”).
189. Jim Tankersley, Shift to a Service-Driven Economy Delays Job Recovery, WASH. POST
(May 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/shift-to-services-delays-jobrecovery/2013/05/03/a78ec0f0-b3f3-11e2-9a98-4be1688d7d84_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
29KX-Z6PH]. “Goods production supplied about three-fifths of economic output in 1950 and
about half of its jobs. By 2010, growth in the service sector has accounted for two-thirds of output
and seven out of every 10 jobs.” Id.; see also CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 112
(describing how women have benefitted from expansion of the service sector).
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easier to deal with household tasks. 190 By the end of the eighties, women’s
increasing access to education won them access to the professional and
managerial ranks. 191 By the turn of the twenty-first century, women had
become the better-educated sex, and in the early years of the twenty-first
century, women’s labor force participation reached all-time highs, even
though their wages still lagged behind men’s wages throughout the labor
force. 192
Women’s economic progress undermined the male family wage system in
three important ways. First, while men continued to earn more than women,
women have won greater economic independence. As late as 1971, principles
of coverture still limited a woman’s rights in marriage. 193 By the end of the
twentieth century, she was much more likely to have her own job, her own
income and, if she wanted, control of her separate assets. 194 This meant
women had greater ability to leave an unhappy relationship if they chose. 195
With divorce reform and the pent-up divorce demand from the unusually
young marriages of the fifties, divorce rates rose steadily from the seventies
into the nineties. 196
Second, two-earner families have become more critical to family
well-being. The stability of women’s employment steadily increased both
compared to the days when women were forced to leave the labor force if
they got pregnant 197 and in comparison with the declining security in men’s
190. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 104 (describing the impact of fast-food restaurants and
labor-saving devices).
191. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 40–41.
192. See, e.g., Mary Beth Marklein, College Gender Gap Widens: 57% Are Women, USA
TODAY (Oct. 19, 2005, 11:41 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2005-10-19male-college-cover_x.htm [https://perma.cc/E7YW-AZND] (showing male and female
representation on college campuses by race and income using data compiled by the National
Center for Education Statistics); TOOSSI & MORISI, supra note 182, at 2 (showing trends in
women’s labor force participation); CARBONE ET AL., supra note 185 (manuscript at 1–5).
193. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 674 (2015) (“One State’s law, for example,
provided in 1971 that ‘the husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him; her
legal civil existence is merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes her separately,
either for her own protection, or for her benefit.’” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 53–501 (1935)).
194. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 40–41.
195. Id. at 114–16.
196. Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second
Demographic Transition, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 613–14 (2004) (showing steady increase in
divorce rates into the nineties after which the rates diverge by class).
197. LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MATERNITY LEAVE AND EMPLOYMENT
PATTERNS
OF
FIRST-TIME
MOTHERS:
1961–2008,
at
3–4
(2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-128.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R8N-6DCZ]. One of the
reasons is that women are more likely to be employed in the public sector. Approximately 60%
of employees in the state and local public sector (teachers, etc.) are women compared to about
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employment over time. 198 Yet trading off workforce participation and
domestic responsibilities is more challenging than managing rigid gender
roles, especially during periods of increased male income insecurity. 199
Third, the infrastructure necessary to support women’s workforce
participation has yet to be fully institutionalized. Well-off women’s increased
income pays for the labor-saving devices, cleaning crews, restaurant meals,
and commercial childcare that make full-time workforce participation
possible. 200 These expenses—whether for high-quality day care centers or
housekeeping crews—are often beyond the reach of the working class. 201
Working-class women, like the working-class women in factory jobs a
century earlier, often find themselves in inflexible jobs that they do not
particularly enjoy that take them away from home and children more than
they would like. 202 This in turn makes them more dependent on families and
partners to fill in the gaps, which in turn increases relationship stress. 203
But the other change in family security depended on what was happening
to men. The secure job paying a family wage was disappearing and that meant
women’s market labor was becoming essential to family well-being for all
but those at the very top of the economic scale. 204
B. Employees and the End of Loyalty
Katherine Stone begins an article on the changing nature of employment
with a description of a play depicting striking British miners in the Thatcher

47% of employees in the private sector. David Cooper & Julia Wolfe, Cuts to the State and Local
Public Sector Will Disproportionately Harm Women and Black Workers, ECON. POL’Y INST.:
WORKING ECON. BLOG (July 9, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/cuts-to-the-state-andlocal-public-sector-will-disproportionately-harm-women-and-black-workers/ [https://perma.cc/
5M5U-WLRN]. African-Americans are also more likely to work in the public sector. Id. And
public-sector jobs have become more unionized. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Union
Membership
(Annual)
News
Release
(Jan.
22,
2021,
10:00
AM),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.htm
[https://perma.cc/VR8N-MFAC].
Indeed,
public-sector unions have five times the membership rate of private-sector unions. Id.
198. Stone, supra note 99, 544–48, 574 (summarizing evidence that shows declining job
tenure and concluding that it understates the increased precarity of employment).
199. AMATO ET AL., supra note 183, at 123–24 (describing how working-class women’s need
to work to compensate for their partners’ declining fortunes has led to increased marital tensions
and divorce proneness).
200. Id. (describing how the income better-educated women contributed to their families
often went to hiring cleaning services or restaurant means).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 124 (describing increase in marital tensions by class).
203. Id. at 122.
204. Id. at 123–24.
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era. 205 She writes about how the play portrays the end of the nineteenth and
twentieth century workers’ world, with “notions of community, solidarity,
and manhood” giving way to “a new world of individual expression, personal
risk, and opportunity.” 206 In the new world, employment security
disappears. 207 New opportunities emerge for those positioned to take
advantage of them. 208 But risks increase, and corporatized social insurance
does not address the new uncertainties. 209 In the new world of the information
age, “knowledge workers, entrepreneurs, free agents, and laboring drifters
move about in diffuse networks, working on projects, delinked from stable
employing institutions.” 210
Four key changes explain the new era. First, automation has reduced the
need for manual labor. 211 Large industrialization-era organizations like Ford
Motor Company or U.S. Steel once employed large labor forces to perform
routine tasks. 212 Today, much of that production has been mechanized,
reducing labor demand. 213 Second, globalization has made it easier to shift
production abroad, with large corporations moving factories to countries with
lower labor costs. 214 This contributes to the erosion of blue-collar wages in
the United States. 215 Third, legal changes and deunionization have made it
easier to outsource jobs, not just abroad, but also to the janitorial company

205. Katherine V.W. Stone, Rupture and Invention: The Changing Nature of Work and the
Implications for Social Policy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR LAW FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 154, 154–55 (Richard Bales & Charlotte Garden eds., 2020).
206. Id. at 155.
207. Id. at 159–60.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 155.
210. Id.
211. Claire Cain Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China. It’s Automation, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-longterm-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html [https://perma.cc/V259-C7TN]; ANDREW
YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING JOBS AND
WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS OUR FUTURE, at xiii–xiv (2018).
212. Stone, supra note 99, at 527–28, 531–33.
213. YANG, supra note 211, at 36–40; Miller, supra note 211 (summarizing academic
literature and concluding that automation is a bigger factor than trade in explaining loss of
manufacturing jobs); see also Richard Baldwin, White-Collar Robots Are Coming for Jobs, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-collar-robots-are-comingfor-jobs-11548939601 [https://perma.cc/W5XG-2FJM] (describing new round of automation
affecting white-collar employees).
214. Katherine V.W. Stone, Globalization and the Middle Class 2, 21–22 (Univ. Cal. L.A.
Sch. of L., Research Paper No. 12-16, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2150412
[https://perma.cc/TJ5W-U56L].
215. Id. at 2 (arguing that the price of labor in China may affect what American workers can
bargain for).
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down the street. 216 A company janitor at General Motors often enjoyed the
same health and pensions benefits as other employees; a janitor with a small
business typically enjoys lower pay, less job security, and fewer benefits. 217
Finally, the combination of technological innovation, financialization, and
short-term focused corporate objectives have increased the rate of change. 218
The corporations that dominated the national landscape in 1910 were largely
the same corporations that did so in the sixties, and they tended to be
companies that either benefitted from economies of scale and barriers to entry
(steel, autos) or that served regulated markets (energy, communications). 219
The largest firms today, in contrast, involve a more varied and rotating mix
of financial (Berkshire-Hathaway), tech (Apple), and retail (Walmart) giants
in addition to some of the surviving energy and auto companies. 220 Moreover,
while tech appears to be the biggest winner, it employs substantially fewer
workers than manufacturing and retail did at their height. 221 These companies
depend to a greater degree on skilled workers who can navigate the
companies’ changing needs in competitive global markets. 222
These changes substantially alter the employment relationship. Katherine
Stone has described the result as a new “psychological contract,” in which
both the company and the worker “have lower expectations for long-term
employment, employees are responsible for their own career development,

216. Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability for
Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 201, 212–13 (2011) (“While a large or medium-size firm in the middle of the twentieth century
might have produced its own component parts and other inputs, and provided its own janitorial,
maintenance, copying, printing, food, delivery, distribution, and storage services, these tasks now
have been shifted to independent firms, sometimes through multiple intermediaries or supply
chains. . . . [and] outsourcing production overseas and domestically is standard practice.”); see
also DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE 8–10 (2014) (arguing that the fissured workplace
involves transferring all of a business’s non-core activities to other entities); David Weil,
Understanding the Present and Future of Work in the Fissured Workplace Context, 5 RSF 147,
148 (2019).
217. Stone, supra note 205, at 158–59, 161 (describing outsourcing not just of cleaning needs
but also bookkeeping and accounting, and describing the use of “phony ‘independent
contractors’” to perform janitorial services).
218. Stone, supra note 99, at 531–35, 549 (noting the pressure for “short-term cost reduction”
and the resulting changes in production).
219. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 92–94, 118–19 (1967).
220. Fortune 500, FORTUNE (2020), http://fortune.com/fortune500/ [https://perma.cc/4S2ZTJJF]. Walmart is number one; Amazon (a combination of tech and retail) is number two. Id.
221. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 92 (discussing relatively low numbers of employees in
tech-dominated corporations).
222. See Stone, supra note 205, at 161.
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and commitment to the work has replaced commitment to the job and
organization.” 223 Others refer to it as the “casualization” of employment. 224
These new employment terms have different implications for the skilled
and the unskilled. “The ambitious see many positions as stepping stones in a
personal saga rather than as a source of commitment.” 225 For them,
“employability security” has replaced “employment security.” 226 Those with
the best opportunities acquire the right degrees, going back to school if
necessary. 227 They seek experience, often starting with unpaid internships. 228
They switch jobs—and often cities—as opportunities arise. 229 In accordance
with the implicit terms of this psychological contract, neither employer nor
employee is loyal to the other. 230
For unskilled workers, these changes mean that there may be neither
security nor opportunity. Blue-collar industrial jobs often required little skill
outside of company-specific training. 231 When these factories close, the
workers have few options that pay as well. 232 By the nineties, retail firms (and
McDonald’s) had eclipsed manufacturing as the biggest employers. 233
Companies like Walmart are willing to hire those without skill or experience,
but Walmart pays its hourly workers little more than the minimum wage with
223. Stone, supra note 99, at 552 (quoting Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe,
Antecedents and Consequences of Relational Components of the New Psychological Contract, 20
J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 323, 324 (1999)).
224. See LUC BOLTANSKI & ÈVE CHIAPELLO, THE NEW SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 224 (Gregory
Elliott trans., 2007).
225. June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1009
(2017); BOLTANKSI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 224, at 93 (observing that acquisition of experience
increases personal capital and thus employability).
226. Stone, supra note 99, at 525.
227. Id. at 546–47.
228. Id. at 540–44.
229. Id. (describing frequent jobs changes).
230. Id. at 653.
231. Id. at 535.
232. CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
MANUFACTURING LOW PAY: DECLINING WAGES IN THE JOBS THAT BUILT AMERICA’S MIDDLE
CLASS 1, 5–7 (2014), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Manufacturing-LowPay-Declining-Wages-Jobs-Built-Middle-Class.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3CG-MUAH] (observing
that even in the same industries, such as autos, the new manufacturing jobs are not as good as the
ones that have been lost).
233. See Lauren Weber, Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They
Rent Workers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2017, 11:46 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-ofthe-worlds-largest-employers-no-longer-sell-things-they-rent-workers-1514479580
[https://
perma.cc/2VHD-6A4G]; Alexander E.M. Hess, The 10 Largest Employers in America, USA
TODAY
(Aug.
22,
2013,
7:48
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/08/22/ten-largest-employers/2680249/
[https://perma.cc/95RU-GJQW].
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few benefits or opportunities for advancement. 234 Finally, independent
contractors, gig workers, 235 and temp agencies 236 provide a variety of
employment opportunities that fill in the gaps left by other forms of
employment. While they provide some workers greater control of working
hours and conditions, they typically require that workers acquire skills on
their own and provide little in the way of social insurance or benefits. 237
C. Employability and Family Strategies
The upwardly mobile middle class responded to these changes, just as the
upwardly mobile middle class of the industrial era did: with a new family
strategy. As we have written elsewhere, this strategy involves investment in
women’s as well as men’s income capacity, postponing family formation
until after a couple achieves emotional maturity and financial independence,
and the remaking of relationship terms to emphasize mutual respect and
shared decision-making. 238 The changed relationship between partners
contributes to a family’s ability to realize “employability security” rather than
“employment security.” 239 Mature adults (in this system) have completed
their formal education, worked through the internships and job changes that
give them marketable skills, and acquired the cushion in terms and income
and flexibility necessary to be able to trade-off responsibilities with a partner.
This new strategy provides a measure of family security—on terms beyond
the reach of a good part of the population.
234. Nelson Lichtenstein, Wal-Mart: A Template for Twenty-First-Century Capitalism, in
WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALISM 3, 21 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed.,
2006).
235. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF
U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS
IN
2018,
at
18
(2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-ushouseholds-201905.pdf [https://perma.cc/C32Z-68V4]. A Federal Reserve study indicated that
30% of American adults had engaged in a gig activity in the last month, with an average of five
hours for each respondent who did. See id. at 2. The report defined “gig” work to include on-line
and off-line activities such as child care. Id. at 18.
236. See, e.g., ERIN HATTON, THE TEMP ECONOMY 1–2 (2011) (documenting the rise of the
temp economy); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in
the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2016) (discussing the lack of protection for
temp workers and independent contractors).
237. See Stone, supra note 205, at 160–61; HATTON, supra note 236, at 1–2.
238. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 117–18 (describing new marital script);
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES 1–2 (2010) (showing
class-based nature of marriage); DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW AMERICA’S
FOUNDATIONAL MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE
ELITE 30 (2019) (documenting how the loss of middle-class jobs results in lower marriage rates).
239. Stone, supra note 99, at 525.
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The legal regulation of marriage reinforces this strategy. 240 The changed
marital terms are egalitarian in form as they assume a partnership with equal
contributions. At divorce, the couple’s assets are equally divided, and shared
parenting has become the norm. 241 For couples in unequal, unhappy, unfair,
or unstable relationships, however, legal commitments may undermine
security. 242
To explain why, it is useful to consider the economics of risk management.
That analysis posits that business enterprises with high-income volatility
require a larger capital base to survive. 243 The reason is that most businesses,
like most families, have fixed expenses. If revenues plunge, even temporarily,
the entity may be forced to default on its payments, triggering evictions,
collection actions, or bankruptcy. 244 Families are no different. 245 A Federal
Reserve Report indicated that close to 40% of Americans would have
difficulty paying an unexpected bill of $400. 246 According to the same report,
30% of American adults have income that varies from month to month, and
a quarter of adults under the age of thirty receive financial assistance from
someone outside of their household, typically parents. 247 Many couples,
particularly young couples, have no cushion to weather unexpected expenses
or income losses. 248
240. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 111–17 (describing the emergence of “seesaw” marriages in which couples trade off work and family obligations as circumstances change
and corresponding legal changes).
241. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 85–87 (2016)
(describing changed legal regulation of marriage).
242. Id. at 118–21 (explaining how marriage is a bad deal for couples who do not equally
share responsibilities).
FIN.
INST.,
243. See,
e.g.,
Earnings
Volatility,
CORP.
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/earnings-volatility/ [https://
perma.cc/5GK3-9KHF] (describing how greater earnings volatility increases risk of bankruptcy
and increases cost of capital).
244. JOANNA SMITH-RAMANI, DAVID MITCHELL & KATHERINE LUCAS MCKAY, ASPEN INST.,
INCOME VOLATILITY: WHY IT DESTABILIZES WORKING FAMILIES AND HOW PHILANTHROPY CAN
MAKE
A
DIFFERENCE
4
(2017),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/12/AFN_2017_Income-Volatility_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8HZ-F3XV] (finding that income volatility contributes to paying
bills late, foregoing necessary medical care, food insecurity, housing instability, and higher costs
associated with late fees and credit card debt).
245. Id. at 6 (describing an increase in income volatility, particularly for low-income families,
because of “instability and unpredictability in earned income, changes in income from public
benefits, and changes in household income caused by changes in household structure”).
246. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 235, at 2.
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Lisa A. Gennetian, Sharon Wolf, Heather D. Hill & Pamela A.
Morris, Intrayear Household Income Dynamics and Adolescent School Behavior,
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Instability thus destabilizes working-class families. While better-off
couples may have the resources to respond to a job loss by going back to
school or taking a lower-paying job that supplies new skills, working-class
men have more difficulty recovering financially, 249 and layoffs often
exacerbate substance abuse, violence, and other behavioral issues. 250 Even
without such issues, many individuals are reluctant to commit to a partner
who is not financially stable for fear that the relationship will deplete their
own resources. 251
Practically this means that while marriage is a source of strength for
couples who can trade off childcare and workforce participation in ways that
allow the family to marshal the resources necessary for investment in children
and in adult “employability,” it can be a threat to working-class families. 252
It also means that the working class has little ability to form families on
middle-class terms, and that marriage without those terms does not and
cannot serve as the foundation for family security and stability. 253
***

52 DEMOGRAPHY 455, 473 (2015) (finding income instability to be nearly double in the lowest
quintile compared to the highest quintile despite welfare programs); Eichner, supra note 78, at
258 (maintaining that the social safety net is “less responsive to external economic shocks
suffered by poor and female-headed families than it was thirty years ago”).
249. See, e.g., ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND
PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 2000S 103–04 (2011)
(indicating that while white-collar workers often switch jobs, blue-collar workers are more likely
to experience involuntary layoffs with longer periods between jobs and long-term declines in
income).
250. See, e.g., Tony Dokoupil, Lifestyle: Laid-Off Men Don’t Do Dishes, NEWSWEEK (Feb.
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/20/men-will-be-men.html
20,
2009,
7:00
PM),
[https://perma.cc/D8XB-FNDL] (describing laid-off men as more likely to engage in domestic
violence and alcoholism); KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 73 (3d ed. 2011) (indicating that over half of poor
women’s relationships with the fathers of their children end because of domestic violence).
251. See, e.g., Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of
Uncertainty: A Post-Moynihan Perspective on African American Women and Marriage, 621
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 132, 135–36 (2009) (observing that many
African-American women were concerned that “monetary entanglements with another would
deplete their resources”).
252. See, e.g., HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 2 (2012)
(describing a young woman who explains that being with the father of her child “would just mean
one less granola bar for the two of us.”).
253. For a description of these marriage/nonmarriage dynamics, see id. at 118–22 (describing
wariness about sharing principles); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family
Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1185; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Blackstonian Marriage,
Gender, and Cohabitation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1247 (2019).
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These changes act together to dismantle the family wage system of the
industrial era. The new organizational regime prizes high degrees of
flexibility, which in turn depend on network-based organization and human
capital investment. 254 The upwardly mobile middle class has redesigned its
family strategy to facilitate greater flexibility and investment. 255 The benefits
of this system are beyond the reach of the working class. They lack access to
the good jobs of the new economy, and without income stability or a capital
cushion, they lack access to the “see-saw” relationships that hedge against
risk and provide a cushion in the new era. 256 Social insurance tied to specific
employers and marriage does not reach them at all. It is time to rethink the
terms of family—and societal—stability and security.
III.

UNCOUPLING AND THE REDESIGN OF FAMILY SECURITY AND
STABILITY

At the height of the industrial era, society provided for family security and
stability through three interlocking mechanisms. First, large industrial
organizations secured a stable workforce by providing relatively secure
employment at above-market wages 257 to a reliable workforce groomed to
meet their needs. 258 Second, the male family wage extended the benefits of
that system in ways that reinforced breadwinner identification with
employment as a source of status and meaning, 259 with a husband’s income
affecting whether a wife worked. 260 Third, the New Deal architects designed
254. Stone, supra note 205, at 158–59 (“Knowledge and innovation rather than economies
of scale are the key source of value and competitive advantage,” and firms therefore seek “both
operational flexibility to utilize employees in different capacities as needed, and numerical
flexibility to grow or shrink the size of the workforce on short notice.”). Correspondingly,
Kaiponanea Matsumura argues that family law must consider what he labels “transition rules” to
minimize disruptions in status and enable people to move between relationships. Matsumura,
supra note 57, at 730–34.
255. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 83–87 (describing how the benefits of the
system come from increased class differences in parental time and money spent on children).
256. ROSIN, supra note 252, at 4–5 (referring to see-saw marriages).
257. See Raff & Summers, supra note 93, at S83 (discussing how the Ford strategy took hold
in the entire auto industry, which paid wages 40% higher than other industries).
258. See supra Part I.B.
259. See supra Part I.B.
260.
As married women began to enter the labor market in greater numbers, labor
economists analyzed female labor supply decisions in the context of the family
unit, rather than the individual, and inquired about the influence of husband’s
income on wife’s “gainful employment.” . . . [M]arried women’s gainful
employment was negatively related to husband’s income. The evidence
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a social insurance system that filled in the gaps of this system while
disguising the role of the state in doing so. 261 Unionization, particularly in the
era following World War II, helped to reset labor markets in ways that raised
blue-collar wages outside the ranks of the unionized, and social insurance
programs such as Social Security largely eliminated poverty among seniors
through a system that depended more on redistribution than the narrow
definitions of desert used to justify the program. 262 The system, in short,
depended on large, dominant corporate institutions that acted in concert with
an active governmental role and the institutionalization of worker interests. 263
The design of a new system must similarly complement the redesign of
employment and family. Large corporate entities have become much more
network-like in their organization. They routinely prune workforces and
replace them with independent contractors, temporary workers, or new
affiliates. 264 They invest less in worker training while giving individual
employees greater authority in ways that enhance their experience, skills, and
ultimate employability.265 They have shifted pension benefits from defined
benefit systems guaranteeing workers’ retirement income to more portable,
defined contribution systems that transfer the risk of market losses to the
workers. In short, the companies benefit from deregulation and the
destruction of union power, giving them much greater flexibility—and
increasing individual insecurity and family instability.266
suggested a rather large income effect, “a freeing of married women from the
necessity of working outside the home.”
Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution that Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and
Family, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2006).
261. Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 123, at 350.
262. KATHLEEN ROMIG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, SOCIAL SECURITY LIFTS
MORE AMERICANS ABOVE POVERTY THAN ANY OTHER PROGRAM (2020),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/10-25-13ss.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G76P2L29]; TERESA GHILARDUCCI, BRIDGET FISHER & ZACHARY KNAUSS, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON.
POL’Y ANALYSIS, NOW IS THE TIME TO ADD RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS TO SOCIAL SECURITY: THE
GUARANTEED
RETIREMENT
ACCOUNT
PROPOSAL
4
(2015),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/GRA_3.
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V22-QKKZ].
263. Cioffi, supra note 146, at 1103–04 (describing Galbraith’s conception of countervailing
powers); Wells, supra note 147, at 322 (describing union-management peace in the postwar era).
264. See, e.g., All Employees, Temporary Help Services (1990-2016), FED. RSRV. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TEMPHELPS [https://perma.cc/V7U2AYRQ] (charting the rise of temporary workers from 1990 to 2020); Stone, supra note 99, at
561–62 (observing that globalization has to focus on adaptability).
265. BOLTANSKI & CHIAPELLO, supra note 224, at 93 (observing that workers value
experience that enhances employability more than employment security in the new era).
266. SMITH-RAMANI ET AL., supra note 244, at 4–6 (describing increase in family instability
and attributing it changes in work, benefits, and family structure).
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The challenge, therefore, for a new system of family security and stability
is how to protect individuals in this new environment. Unlike the old system,
the new one can no longer depend on long-term employment, nor on the
breadwinner–homemaker families that have become obsolete in the new era.
The system must accordingly become more individualized; it must be
uncoupled from employment and from marriage. In many ways, the
transformation is already well underway. The most critical issue, however, is
whether the state role will continue to be disguised or whether it will come
out into the open as a critical component of family security and stability.
A. Uncoupling Benefits from Marriage: The Beginning
The prerequisite for individual financial security has become
“employability;” that is, acquisition of the education, skills, and experience
necessary to become marketable in a competitive labor pool. 267 The
partnership ideal in the information age has become two adults with the
flexibility, maturity, and trust necessary to trade off work, childcare, and
other family tasks in ways that reflect shared decision-making. 268 Marriage
without employability (or without trust) is unlikely to provide security and
stability. 269 This ideal today is beyond the reach of a good part of the
population. 270 Consequently, tying benefits to marriage simply increases
economic inequality in punitive and counterproductive ways.
To a large degree, American law already reflects this change in the
institution of marriage. The Supreme Court, as early as the 1970s, recognized
the elements of the new middle-class marriage system, which depends on
women’s reproductive autonomy and more egalitarian marital
relationships. 271 And in 2015, the Supreme Court embraced a modern
marriage model shorn of its gendered attributes in extending marriage
equality to same-sex couples. 272 What has yet to happen is the emergence of
a state role extending the benefits of this system to the population as a whole,
decoupling benefits from relationships.
267. Stone, supra note 99, at 552–53 (describing change from “employment security” to
“employability security”).
268. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 113–14.
269. See supra Part II.C; CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 101 (discussing the
relationship between economic security and marriage).
270. These developments parallel the changes with the Industrial Revolution, which also
produced class-based differences in family strategies. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 64, at 184–85
(describing class-based differences to industrialization).
271. For a summary of the changes, see CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 111–13
(describing new marital script).
272. See discussion of Obergefell v. Hodges, infra notes 305–329 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court, when squarely presented with the issue of punitive
distinctions based on marriage, has agreed that they are pointless. In Levy v.
Louisiana, for example, the Supreme Court struck down distinctions between
marital and nonmarital children’s ability to bring a wrongful death action. 273
The Court observed:
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because
of his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the
responsibilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and
conscription under the Selective Service Act. How under our
constitutional regime can he be denied correlative rights which
other citizens enjoy? 274

The Court was even more direct in Eisenstadt v. Baird. 275 In this case, the
Court considered a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
unmarried persons’ contraceptive use. 276 Seven years earlier, the Court had
recognized a constitutional right to privacy, permitting married couples
access to contraception. 277 While Massachusetts argued that unmarried
individuals did not enjoy the same expectation of sexual privacy, the Court
relied on the Equal Protection Clause to find that a married couple was “not
an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
two individuals.” 278 Each individual, not each married couple, enjoyed the
right to privacy. 279
These opinions laid the foundation for a new legal approach to marriage,
one that no longer treated marriage as mandatory and placed less weight on
it as a bright-line distinction for the allocation of rights. In this context,
sexuality did not always have to coincide with marriage, 280 and preventing
273. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
274. Id. For a thorough review of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the legitimacy cases and
their emphasis on harm to “innocent children,” see Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the
Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1290 (2015).
275. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
276. Id. at 440.
277. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that a ban on
contraceptive access to married couples was unconstitutional as a violation of the right to
privacy); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (establishing the same right for unmarried couples seven
years later).
278. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Court used the term “invidious” to describe the
distinction, and also referred to an “arbitrary and unreasonable government,” suggesting that the
standard is close to rational basis. Id. at 454.
279. Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
1207, 1225 (2016).
280. During this same period, the shotgun marriage, which has served as the fall back
channeling pregnancy into marriage, was also fading. See George A. Akerlof, Janet L. Yellen &
Michael L. Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q.J.
ECON. 277, 278 (1996).
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the distribution of contraception to single women became pointless and cruel.
The Eisenstadt Court, in applying the Due Process clause, explained that: “It
would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child [or the physical and
psychological dangers of an abortion] as punishment for fornication.” 281 The
Court employed the same reasoning to hold a few years later that the right to
privacy did not permit New York to prohibit the sale or distribution of
contraceptives to individuals under the age of sixteen. 282 The Court reiterated
that it was inappropriate to attempt to channel sexuality into marriage by
making the birth of a child the penalty, and it doubted in any event whether
deterrence worked. 283 Linking substantial benefits to a desire to promote
marriage, when it results in hardship to substantial parts of the population,
should be seen as similarly irrational. 284 The Supreme Court in the seventies
nonetheless did not find a state obligation to treat married and unmarried
couples equally 285 nor did it find an affirmative obligation to extend benefits
to the unmarried. 286 In a 5-4 decision in 1979, for example, the Supreme Court
continued to interpret Social Security survivors’ benefits solely as a
replacement for a wage-earner’s income that allowed married mothers to stay
out of the labor market. 287
B. Uncoupling Benefits from Marriage: Round 2
The much more dramatic redefinition of the state role came with the
congressional dismantling of ADC in the nineties. The statutory changes,
while ironically done in the name of marriage promotion, constitute a major
281. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448. The Court also expressed skepticism about whether it
worked. Id.
282. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 695 (1977).
283. Id.
284. See Courtney G. Joslin, Discrimination In and Out of Marriage, 98 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 2
(2018) (arguing for the dismantling of distinctions based on marriage); Kaiponanea T.
Matsumura, A Right Not To Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1545–47 (2016) (noting that not
every law that incentivizes or deters marriage is unconstitutional).
285. See Mayeri, supra note 274, at 1352 (concluding that the cases stopped short of
recognizing the link between “marital supremacy” and the “battle for racial, sexual, and economic
justice”).
286. See id. at 1337 (describing how the Court distinguished between provisions that made
children ineligible for benefits because their parents were unmarried, thereby punishing the
children for “illegitimacy” versus provisions for adults premised on the loss of access to a wageearner’s support, where “marriage could be used as a shorthand for dependency” on the lost
income).
287. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 293 (1979). The Court ruled that “Congress could
reasonably conclude that a woman who has never been married to the wage earner is far less likely
to be dependent upon the wage earner at the time of his death.” Id. at 289.
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part of the uncoupling from marriage. The New Deal legislation of the thirties
had rejected universal child allowances in favor of the means-tested program,
known in the nineties as Aid for Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC). 288 Once women gained access to the workforce, however, it no
longer made sense to treat women as intrinsically dependent solely because
of motherhood, and President Bill Clinton vowed “to end welfare as we know
it.” 289 In 1996, Congress replaced the program with the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. 290
TANF, however, rested on a fundamental contradiction. 291 Two of its four
objectives were tied to marriage, treating marriage promotion and the
prevention of nonmarital births as primary objectives. 292 Yet, most of its focus
involved its second objective: getting single mothers off the welfare rolls and
into paid employment, 293 rejecting the premise that only men could earn
enough to support a family. 294 TANF used punitive measures, limiting the
duration and nature of benefits, as a principal means of accomplishing its
ends. 295 The idea of “responsible motherhood” had shifted from procreation
within marriage to not having more children than you could support without
government assistance. 296

288. See CARBONE, supra note 137, at 200–01 (describing how these programs were shaped
to prioritize assistance to widows and exclude African-Americans and immigrants); Alberto
Alesina, Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Why Doesn’t the United States Have a
European-Style Welfare State?, 2001 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 187, 195 tbl.4
(emphasizing that as far back as 1870, the United States has had lower public welfare benefits
than European countries).
289. See CARBONE, supra note 137, at 205–07 (observing that welfare reform “was fought
on the battleground of permissible motherhood” and that the Act was named the “Personal
Responsibility Act”).
290. See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1770
(2017) (describing program).
291. Mayeri, supra note 274, at 1337–38 (addressing differential treatment of nonmarital
parents).
292. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a).
293. The purpose section of TANF explicitly includes “end[ing] the dependence of needy
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.” Id. §
601(a)(2).
294. See Eichner, supra note 78, at 257 (stating that TANF required mothers to work in paid
jobs in order to receive government aid).
295. See Hammond, supra note 290, at 1730 (observing that most state-level changes
“involved increased uses of sanctions, the introduction of family caps, and other means by which
to push recipients off the welfare rolls, all of which would reduce expenditures.”).
296. Eichner, supra note 78, at 257 (treating the adoption of TANF as the triumph of
neoliberal ideology).
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The real import of the shift from AFDC to TANF became the elimination
of cash payments to needy families as an entitlement. 297 That means that not
all of those who qualify receive benefits, and even those who remain enrolled
do not necessarily receive the promised assistance. 298 And, unsurprisingly, it
has had almost no effect on what was supposed to be the program’s central
purpose—increasing marriage rates. 299
In eliminating AFDC, Congress did recognize, however, that employment
alone might not be sufficient to meet the needs of poor families. To make it
possible for poor mothers to work and support their families, Congress took
three additional steps that provided benefits that were not premised, as AFDC
had been, on compensation for the absence of a wage-earner. It expanded
health care eligibility, 300 the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 301 and food
stamps. 302 While eligibility for these programs often involves restrictive
requirements and while recipients have sometimes been maligned, 303 the
programs recognize a new basis for benefits: the idea that employability
requires at least minimum access to food and medicine and that the market
does not necessarily permit all families to be self-sufficient, given the relative
decline in blue-collar wages and employment security. 304

297. See Hammond, supra note 290, at 1732 (describing a major consequence of the
enactment of TANF as “the elimination of the entitlement”).
298. Id.
299. See, e.g., CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 14–20 (summarizing class-based
changes in family formation); see also Sara Sternberg Greene, The Bootstrap Trap, 67 DUKE L.J.
233, 233 (2017) (observing that the “parents who have most internalized narratives of
self-sufficiency are particularly at risk of financial ruin under the new regime”).
300. Before passage of the ACA, Medicaid “covered only pregnant women, some parents
with dependent children, seniors in long-term care, and low-income individuals with disabilities.”
Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 509–10.
301. See Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 285, 285 (2010) (describing the EITC as the “largest cash-transfer program for
low-income workers with children”). The EITC, however, benefits only those parents who have
paid jobs. Greene, supra note 299, at 237 n.11.
302. See Michael W. Long et al., Public Support for Policies To Improve the Nutritional
Impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 17 PUB. HEALTH
NUTRITION 219, 220 (2012) (“Seventy-seven per cent of [those polled] believed that federal
spending on SNAP should be increased (48%) or maintained (29%) . . . .”).
303. The notion of “deserving poor” has been carried through to Medicaid. See Nicole
Huberfeld & Jessica L. Roberts, Health Care and the Myth of Self-Reliance, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1,
12 (2016); Dayna B. Matthew, Justice and the Struggle for the Soul of Medicaid, 13 ST. LOUIS U.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 29, 31 (2019).
304. See, e.g., Greg M. Shaw, Changes in Public Opinion and the American Welfare State,
124 POL. SCI. Q. 627, 634–35 (2009) (noting that programs that benefit children and the elderly
or that provide in-kind assistance, such as food stamps or medical care, enjoy more support than
need-based cash assistance).
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Completing the process of decoupling from marriage is a fundamental
redefinition of the institution’s purpose and significance.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court’s embrace of marriage
equality did pay homage to the continuing importance of marriage, 305 but the
opinion affirms a model that makes marriage a voluntary act of individual
self-expression. 306 Justice Kennedy’s opinion described four principles
underlying recognition of a constitutional right to marry. 307 The first two
involve personal self-definition. 308 He argued that a right to “marriage is
inherent in the concept of individual autonomy” 309 and that the right to marry
is “fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in
its importance to the committed individuals.”310 These first two principles do
not involve an obligation to marry or a definition of marriage tied to its role
in providing economic security and stability.
The last two principles involve the benefits that come from public
recognition of a couple’s marital status. 311 Yet, the second two principles,
which treat marriage as fundamentally important to the societal order, are in
many ways in tension with the first two. If marriage is a critical part of
self-definition, then it should, by definition, be optional: not all individuals,
or couples, will choose to define themselves in terms of marriage. 312 The
majority opinion clearly rejected the notion that the principal importance of
marriage lies with its connection to heterosexual procreation, 313 but it did not
convincingly address the question of why marriage should remain
foundational to the social order—and therefore “fundamental” as a matter or
right—at all.

305. For criticism of the case in these terms, see Murray, supra note 279, at 1249, 1252
(arguing that the Court’s praise of marriage will encourage lower courts to interpret statutory
terms like “family” or “kinship” narrowly to require marriage rather than broadly to include
nonmarital families).
306. Some refer to this as “capstone” marriage, suggesting that it serves as a celebration of
the couple’s success. We dislike the term because it obscures the family strategies that make
human capital investment the necessary precondition to stable and secure relationships. See supra
Part II.C.
307. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646–48 (2015).
308. Id. at 646–47.
309. Id. at 665, 666 (observing further that marriage decisions are “among the most intimate
that an individual can make”).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 669 (“[M]arriage is ‘the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.’” (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888))).
312. Cf. id. at 646 (linking marriage to childrearing).
313. Id. at 669 (“[T]he right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have
children.”).
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Justice Kennedy’s third principle, describing the importance of marriage
for childrearing, underscores the fact that parental connection to children,
rather than marriage itself, has become the defining feature of family life. His
opinion stated that “[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability
marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are
somehow lesser.” 314 Presumably, what Justice Kennedy had in mind when he
referred to predictability is the difficulty unmarried couples have had in
gaining legal recognition of their parental status. 315 One of the couples in the
Obergefell litigation, for example, consisted of two women raising children
together in Michigan. 316 Michigan permitted only married couples or single
individuals to adopt. 317 Since the two women could not marry, their children
each had only one legal parent. 318 Justice Kennedy explained that, if tragedy
were to befall either partner, “the other would have no legal rights over the
children she had not been permitted to adopt.” 319 This couple, in bringing the
case, sought “relief from the continuing uncertainty their unmarried status
creates in their lives.” 320 It is clearly accurate to say that the lack of legal
recognition of their parental status complicates their children’s lives, but that
does not answer the question why it is marriage, rather than parental
recognition, that constitutes the problem. 321
Justice Kennedy emphasizes in the second half of the sentence that
children are also harmed by the stigma that comes from the denial of their
parents’ ability to marry, particularly where that denial reflects disapproval
314. Id. at 668.
315. The opinion, in referring to unpredictability and instability, mentioned marriage-related
benefits such as
taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal
privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking
authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and
visitation rules.
Id. at 670. Some of these rights, such as intestate succession, can be addressed through
wills or other forms of contract, but parenthood cannot be. Id.
316. Id. at 658.
317. Id. at 658–59.
318. Id. at 659.
319. Id.
320. Id. The unpredictability argument, however, at least as it relates to marriage, is circular.
It maintains that since the couple cannot marry, they cannot acquire legal recognition as parents
of each other’s children, and that lack of legal recognition creates harmful uncertainty for their
children; therefore, they should be allowed to marry.
321. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood, 72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 269
(2020).
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of the parents’ relationship with each other. 322 This argument is more
compelling. Nonetheless, if it is the differential treatment that causes the
stigma, this is a classic equal protection argument, resting on the
discriminatory denial of access to a state-sanctioned status rather than a due
process argument resting on the fundamental importance of the status itself. 323
The fourth principle Justice Kennedy articulates is similarly unpersuasive.
It refers to the role of marriage as “a keystone of the Nation’s social order.” 324
The majority makes no effort to explain why marriage should still be seen as
such a keystone. Instead, the opinion again invokes equal protection analysis
to state that “it is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central
institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent
purposes of marriage.” 325 The harm the Court identifies from being denied
access is dignitary; 326 it comes from the societal judgment that the unions
same-sex couples form are somehow lesser and therefore stigmatized. The
value Obergefell associates with the institution of marriage comes from its
“transcendent purposes,” i.e., from its dynamic allowing “two people to find
a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just
the two persons.” 327
In short, Obergefell’s ode to marriage, which scholars have read to
denigrate the standing of those who do not marry, celebrates marriage’s
importance as an expression of the couple’s commitment to each other and
the harm that comes from the denial of an equal right to recognition for
same-sex couples.
The meaning of marriage within the family wage tradition was quite
different. That had what James Q. Wilson refers to as “the authority of
marriage” tied to a command that one must marry in order to merit societal
support for the childrearing project, based on an assumption of women and

322. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 660 (referring to condemnation of same-sex intimacy “as
immoral by the state itself in most Western nations” through the middle of the twentieth century).
323. For an examination of this debate, see Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell,
40 CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 633–34 (2018) (describing the argument that in order to justify a
positive right to marry, the Obergefell opinion “waded into debates about the nature
of marriage that it could have avoided with equality analysis”).
324. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 646. As Serena Mayeri notes in her exploration of nonmarital
parenthood, the Court does not “question the superiority of marital families.” Serena
Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125
YALE L.J. 2292, 2392 (2016).
325. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 647.
326. Id. at 666 (“There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to
marry and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”).
327. Id. at 647, 657.
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children’s intrinsic dependence. 328 Instead, what Obergefell recognized is that
marriage has become a means to express love and commitment by those in a
position to make a meaningful choice about how they wish to live their
lives. 329
This jurisprudence, much like the Supreme Court’s decision in Muller v.
Oregon a century earlier, embraces what has become the middle-class family
ideal. In the Muller time period, that family ideal was a breadwinner husband
supporting a dependent wife; today, the middle-class model involves an
egalitarian romantic ideal. What none of these developments address is how
the elements that allow couples to reach the point of self-definition have been
placed beyond the reach of a large part of the population. The Supreme
Court’s decisions from Griswold to Carey, for example, while striking down
prohibitions on the sale and distribution of contraception, did nothing to
ensure that access would be available. 330 The result has been a “dual system”
of contraceptive access; 331 those who enjoy family security have far more
access than those who do not, in large part because of employer-provided
(and taxpayer-subsidized) health insurance. 332 Yet, contraceptive access does
more to promote self-definition than the decision in Obergefell, which

328. WILSON, supra note 58, at 217. “[B]y bestowing a respected status and material benefits
on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations within
marriage rather than without.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 689–90 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “This
singular understanding of marriage has prevailed in the United States throughout our history. . . .
To those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family ‘was a
given: its structure, its stability, roles, and values accepted by all.’” Id. at 690.
329.
Choices about marriage shape an individual’s destiny. As the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has explained, because “it fulfils yearnings for
security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil
marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to
marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 666 (quoting Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955
(Mass. 2003)).
330. During the same era, Congress passed Title X, but since 1980, the funding has been
periodically under assault and unavailable to many groups, such as undocumented immigrants.
See Naomi Cahn, Contraception Matters: Rights, Class, and Context, 24 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. &
SOC. JUST. 529, 537–39 (2018) (discussing class-based inequities in contraceptive access).
331. Id. at 549.
332. Id. at 550–51 (“A 2010 survey (pre-Affordable Care Act) found that more than one-third
of female voters had struggled to afford prescription birth control at some point in their lives and,
as a result, had used birth control inconsistently. At that point, birth control payments
constituted approximately 30–44% total out-of-pocket expenses for health care.”).
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simply—and appropriately—lets additional couples into marriage who have
marshalled the resources on their own necessary to realize its aspirations. 333
While Obergefell thus recognizes the changed nature of marriage, it does
not recognize how the marital ideal it articulates is beyond the reach of much
of the population—and how the very nature of the ideal makes the uncoupling
of marriage from societal benefits that much more critical. Fewer than
two-thirds of American children live with married parents. 334 Accordingly,
children’s needs will not be met effectively by any attempt to: 1) condition
important benefits on marriage; 2) use differential benefits to attempt to
coerce parents into marriage; 335 or 3) promote marriage as an end in itself.
Existing efforts have shifted from marriage to work, 336 but these too are
inadequate, given the changing nature of work. The net effect of the failure
to reconceive the terms of effective support has been to lock more children in
persistent poverty. 337
C. Uncoupling Social Insurance from Employment
The New Deal social insurance system, to the extent it provided greater
family security, depended on the parallel interests of large employers in
securing a stable workforce and the societal interest in encouraging greater
family stability. 338 In the information age, employers do not depend to the
same degree on either large numbers of workers or long-term worker
tenure. 339 Yet, families still depend not just on employment but also on

333. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 238, at 128 (arguing that the change in the nature of
marriage made recognition of marriage equality not only permissible but also a matter of basic
fairness and equality).
334. The American Family Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/17/1-the-american-family-today/ [https://perma.cc/
5RQK-JDLN].
335. Indeed, more recent efforts have focused on removing the disincentives to marriage
embedded in means-tested programs. See, e.g., W. BRADFORD WILCOX, JOSEPH P. PRICE &
ANGELA RACHIDI, MARRIAGE, PENALIZED: DOES SOCIAL-WELFARE POLICY AFFECT FAMILY
FORMATION? 29–31 (2016), https://ifstudies.org/ifs-admin/resources/marriage-penalty-hep2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KHC-DVCZ]. Even then, the studies conclude that program design
has little impact on the incidence of marriage among the poorest recipients. Id. at 31.
336. This was the third objective of the TANF program. See discussion supra Part III.A.
337. Hammond, supra note 290, at 1730.
338. Catherine A. Paul, President Roosevelt’s New Deal, VA. COMMONWEALTH UNIV. LIBRS.
SOC. WELFARE HIST. PROJECT (2017), https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/eras/greatdepression/the-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/9K6D-E5JM].
339. Changes in the American Workplace, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/10/06/1-changes-in-the-american-workplace/
[https://
perma.cc/5VDC-J9M3].
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income stability to feel secure. 340 Three changes, in particular, mean that
employers are no longer appropriate partners for the provision of public
benefits, requiring uncoupling social insurance from employment.
First, and most significantly, as employment has become less secure, tying
benefits to individual employers is no longer feasible. Full-time employment
is less universal than it once was. In 1954, male labor market participation
peaked at over 97%. 341 It has steadily declined since, with employment
becoming more steeply cyclical since the late seventies. 342 Men with no more
than a high school degree suffered the biggest drop, falling by 14%. 343
Women’s labor market participation rose during much of the period, but
peaked in the late nineties and has declined since then. 344 These figures reflect
not just less employment but also less secure job tenure and longer periods
between jobs. 345 Employment is thus no longer sufficiently pervasive to
anchor essential social benefits, 346 and social insurance is not well designed
to cover the gaps. 347
Second, as the nature of employment has changed, employer and
employee interests do not align to the same degree. 348 Today, corporate
officers prioritize short-term shareholder interests at the expense of other
stakeholders. 349 As part of this shift, they have transferred risk to the
340. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 299, at 297–99 (describing how financial instability traps
families in property).
341. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE
LONG-TERM DECLINE IN PRIME-AGE MALE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 2 (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160620_cea_primeage_m
ale_lfp.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8PY-RUNV].
342. See, e.g., Ruggles, supra note 51, at 1817 fig.16 (showing that the percentage of adult
males engaged in wage labor peaked in 1970 and has steadily declined down to levels last seen
in 1860, when a high percentage of the male population still lived on farms). Ruggles also shows
that female labor force participation now roughly equals male participation and is expected to
exceed it in the years ahead. Id.
343. EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., supra note 341, at 13.
344. Elisabeth Jacobs & Kate Bahn, Women’s History Month: U.S. Women’s Labor Force
CTR.
FOR
EQUITABLE
GROWTH
(Mar.
22,
2019),
Participation,
WASH.
https://equitablegrowth.org/womens-history-month-u-s-womens-labor-force-participation/
[https://perma.cc/S9RT-MKR8].
345. Bunker, supra note 23.
346. Id. (showing that male employment has declined significantly after each recession over
the last half century and that employment in each case never returned to its prerecession rates,
with the downturns becoming more severe after the late seventies).
347. See, e.g., Pendo, supra note 21 (discussing high rates of rejection for those with
pre-existing conditions, which are much more of a problem with frequent job changes).
348. Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 1026–29; DAVIS, supra note 17, at 124–26.
349. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 296–97, 304 (2012) (describing emphasis on short-term earnings
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employees. 350 This means that social insurance, in turn, needs to address the
systemic risks that were once factored into the protections large employers
offered. 351
Finally, the information economy produces more “good jobs” with full
benefits for high-value employees and more “bad jobs” with lower wages and
few benefits for the unskilled. 352 This means that employer-provided plans
leave out a high percentage of the labor force. For example, in 2009, roughly
half the workforce lacked employer-based retirement plans. 353 And declining
rates of employer-provided insurance coverage was an important motive for
adoption of the ACA. 354 Compounding the problem, particularly in the case
of health insurance, is the fact that tax-subsidized coverage for some
increases the prices for the uninsured. 355 As a result, employer-provided plans
have become regressive in effect; taxpayers subsidize the better off in ways
that make those without employer benefits worse off in relative and
sometimes absolute terms. 356
Complementing these developments, the Supreme Court sees corporations
as no more than instruments to advance their owners’ aims and unions as no
more than private actors whose societal role does not merit protection. Both
developments suggest that corporations are no longer appropriate partners for
the societal interest in promoting family security and stability, and that,
instead, individuals are the appropriate focus.

that boost share price at the expense of other corporate interests); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 520–23 (2018); Lynn A. Stout,
Response, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2014 (2013);
Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 MD. L. REV. 652, 665, 681 (2020) (indicating
that companies often increase share price at the expense of employees). And Delaware has made
it possible to waive even those obligations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101 to -1110 (2021).
350. See, e.g., JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 13–14 (2008) (describing increased
financial risks including job loss, difficulty in securing health insurance, and less secure pension
rights).
351. See DAVIS, supra note 17, at 122–24 (describing decline in the number of employees at
large corporations and the greater transience in the labor market more generally).
352. See KALLEBERG, supra note 249, at 12–18 (arguing that the information economy tends
to produce more good jobs and bad jobs, hollowing out the center).
353. Maureen Minehan, Obama Budget Could Increase Employer Obligations, 26 EMP.
ALERT 1, 1 (2009).
354. See, e.g., Pendo, supra note 21, at 474 (“[T]he erosion of employer-sponsored coverage
has increased the ranks of the uninsured.”).
355. Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 123, at 354 (observing that “[t]he tax subsidies for
employment-based health insurance and retirement income [have become] the federal
government’s largest ‘tax expenditures’”).
356. See, e.g., id. at 350–51 (describing intrinsic failings of private health insurance markets).
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The Supreme Court’s hostility to labor unions has been compared to the
Court’s actions during the Lochner era. 357 The current Court’s conservative
majority has rejected the very idea of collective action to promote a civic
society ideal. 358 Thus, in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, the Court held that
the First Amendment forbids public-sector unions from collecting mandatory
union fees from nonmember employees, 359 threatening the financial base of
these unions. 360 The Court privileged the right of an individual employee to
avoid paying dues over the union role in advancing workers’ collective
interests. 361
The Supreme Court, at the same time, has adopted a view of corporations
as agents of their owners, with no need to take other considerations, such as
employee interests, into account. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, a closely
held, for-profit corporation refused to provide federally mandated health care
benefits to its employees because the benefits covered the morning after
pill, 362 which the company claimed, inaccurately, acted as an abortifacient. 363
In ruling for the corporation, the Court observed that owners who act through
such corporations do not surrender the rights they might otherwise have. 364
357. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21, 30 (describing
criticism that “the Roberts Court has used the First Amendment much as the Lochner Court did
the Due Process Clause—to thwart democratically chosen outcomes and, more specifically, to
protect the privileges of the economically powerful while resisting legislative and executive
efforts to advance the interests of the less powerful”).
358. Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court’s Challenge to Civil Society, 2019 SUP. CT. REV.
335, 336 (“[I]n fostering a constitutional culture that entitles individuals to opt out of duties they
find disagreeable, the court is eroding the expectation of collective obligation that civil society
requires if it is to thrive.”).
359. See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018).
360. Id. at 2490 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “basic economic theory shows why
a government would think that agency fees are necessary for exclusive representation to work,”
given legislative requirements mandate union representation of all employees, whether members
or not, and classic free-rider problems); see also Bill Blum, Opinion, Recent Rulings Expose
Supreme
Court’s
Anti-Worker
Bias,
TRUTHDIG
(Aug.
8,
2018),
https://www.truthdig.com/articles/recent-rulings-expose-the-supreme-courts-anti-worker-bias/
[https://perma.cc/4PKG-XTUX] (claiming that Janus poses an existential threat to union
survival).
361. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474 (contending that it is impossible to argue that the extent of
state spending for employee benefits is not a matter of a great public concern and therefore that
public employees should not have to pay union fees to advance positions with which they may
not agree); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616, 1626 (2018) (upholding
employers actions requiring employees to sign, as a condition of employment, arbitration
agreements banning collective judicial and arbitral proceedings of any kind, which had the effect
of prohibiting union actions to address wages and hour violations on behalf of the employees).
362. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 688–91 (2014).
363. See Rachel Frank, Miss-Conceptions: Abortifacients, Regulatory Failure, and Political
Opportunity, 129 YALE L.J. 208, 211–24 (2019).
364. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 706–07.
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As a result, Hobby Lobby’s owners had a constitutional right to
simultaneously benefit from publicly subsidized health insurance benefits
while picking and choosing the benefits it offered based on the owners’
particular religious views. The ability to receive public benefits no longer
comes with a duty to advance the public good. 365
The Court’s subsequent opinion in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter
& Paul Home v. Pennsylvania extended the principle. 366 The Little Sisters
operate nursing homes for the elderly poor. 367 In accordance with Catholic
teachings, the Little Sisters took the view “that deliberately avoiding
reproduction through medical means is immoral.” 368 The original HHS
regulations provided that religious employers could be exempted from the
mandate to cover contraception if they filed certain paperwork “selfcertifying” their objections. 369 The Little Sisters, however, objected that “the
self-certification accommodation renders them ‘complicit in providing
[contraceptive] coverage to which they sincerely object.’” 370 The Trump
administration issued new regulations broadly extending the ability of
businesses to opt out of government provisions. 371
The Court upheld the regulations on a 7-2 vote, 372 finding that the
regulations allowing for exemptions from the contraceptive mandate based
on “‘sincerely held’ moral and religious objections” were valid. 373 Indeed,
employers may be entitled to the exemption without consideration of the
365. Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 1016–26; see also Greenhouse, supra note 358, at
347–54.
366. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367
(2020).
367. Id. at 2375.
368. Id. at 2376.
369. Id. at 2370.
370. Id. at 2403 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
371. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative
Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (2018). For a more detailed
discussion of potential government responses to these cases, see Douglas NeJaime and Reva B.
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L.J. 2516 (2015).
372. Justices Breyer and Kagan, who had dissented in Hobby Lobby, upheld the Trump
regulations on administrative law grounds. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2396–401 (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
373. Id. at 2386 (majority opinion); see Greenhouse, supra note 358, at 352 (“Judge Wendy
Beetlestone, in granting a preliminary injunction . . . marveled at the new rule’s ‘remarkable
breadth’ and asked: ‘Who determines whether the expressed moral reason is sincere or not or, for
that matter, whether it falls within the bounds of morality or is merely a preference choice?’ The
administration, she observed, ‘has conjured up a world where a government entity is empowered
to impose its own version of morality on each one of us. . . . That cannot be right.’” (first alteration
added)).
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impact on the affected group (in this case women who would like access to
basic means of contraception such as the birth control pill). 374
Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority in Hobby Lobby and his concurring
opinion in Little Sisters emphasize the government’s potential ability to
deliver contraceptive access in other ways. 375 His logic follows from his
embrace of the unlimited nature of corporate rights. The obvious corollary to
the conclusion that corporate owners have no societal obligations when they
enter the public square is that they are unsuitable partners for advancing
public ends. The obvious response, as Justice Alito suggests, is direct
government provision of health insurance benefits. With employment no
longer providing security, and unions no longer serving as a countervailing
force that systematizes employer benefits, corporations are no longer
appropriate partners for the state in assuring family security.
IV.

UNCOUPLING REALIZED: RECONSTRUCTING FAMILY SECURITY AND
STABILITY

As corporations change, this has implications for designing a system of
family security. Ronald Coase, in his classic article, The Nature of the Firm,
observed in the 1930s that the hallmark of the industrial age was the rise of
large institutions and what Katherine Stone calls “internal labor markets,” 376
and that these features characterized both socialist and capitalist
institutions.377 Today’s firms have reversed that process, preferring networks
that rely on external markets (e.g., temp agencies, independent contractors)
374. While Justice Alito insisted in Hobby Lobby that the ruling would not cost women
anything, the Trump administration, in its petition for certiorari in Little Sisters, took the position
that the contested regulations should be upheld even if they did burden women, asserting that
“any loss of contraceptive coverage to women whose private employers invoke the religious
exemption would result from decisions of those employers, not the government.” Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 26, Trump v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (No. 19-454) sub nom. Little Sisters,
140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); see also Greenhouse, supra note 358, at 352.
375. Little Sisters, 140 S. Ct. at 2393 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Government
could send out “a special card that could be presented at a pharmacy to fill a prescription for
contraceptives without any out-of-pocket expense” or inform employees of the ability to obtain
free contraceptives “by going to a conveniently located government clinic”); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 765 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to Alito’s
insistence that the government could itself “assume the cost of providing” the contraceptives or
could replicate the accommodation provided for religiously affiliated nonprofit organizations);
see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 371, at 2532 (noting difficulties with the proposal).
376. That is, employers who hire almost exclusively at the entry level and promote from
within. See Stone, supra note 116, at 460; see also Carbone & Levit, supra note 225, at 972–74
(explaining significance of Coase’s insights).
377. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389–90 (1937) (observing
that the rise of large institutions characterizes both capitalist and socialist economies).
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to create more flexible commercial entities. 378 The family ideal of the modern
age has changed, in turn, to complement the network-like business
organization. 379 Within this system, commitment to children, rather than
marriage, becomes the indispensable moral command. 380 Security comes
from capital (human and financial) investments that pay off in terms of
savings, employability, and adult relationships built on flexibility, trust, and
mutual respect. 381
A. Reconstructing Through Uncoupling
The missing piece in this reconstruction of the sources of family stability
and security is the redesign of the state role necessary to fill in the gaps of the
new economic order and make its benefits more universally available. The
challenge is how to secure the human capital investment in “employability”
necessary for full participation in the new economy. 382 Given that neither
work nor marriage nor the combination of the two necessarily produces
stability in the new order, the question is how to provide the minimum terms
of a social safety net (food, clothing, housing, health care, and education) that
remakes the basis for family security. Designing such a system—and
redesigning the state to implement it—would require volumes. The fight over
implementation of the ACA illustrates the terms on which the fight for the
new system is likely to be waged. 383
Health insurance access was originally built on the family wage model. 384
Congress structured Medicare to complement the Social Security retirement
program, using a dedicated payroll tax to fund at least part of the program.
Medicaid was initially enacted
to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with
dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals,
whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of
378. Stone, supra note 205, at 155 (describing shift to more flexible and network-like
corporate structures).
379. CARBONE, supra note 137, at 104.
380. Id. at xiii (describing how the courts are rebuilding family law based on the principle of
obligation to children).
381. See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 110, at 117–18 (describing how changed marital
scripts reflect women’s greater equality).
382. See supra Part II.C.
383. See Abbe R. Gluck, Mark Regan & Erica Turret, The Affordable Care Act’s Litigation
Decade, 108 GEO. L.J. 1471, 1474 (2020) (noting “[t]he ACA retains the mixed system of federal,
state, and private healthcare that came before it, but seeks to make the system more generous and
accessible,” and ongoing litigation over it has moved the nation towards more universal access).
384. See supra Part I.C.
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necessary medical services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services
to help such families and individuals attain or retain capability for
independence or self-care. 385

That is, both plans were designed to fill in the gaps of the family wage system.
By the time President Obama proposed the ACA in 2009, however,
increasing numbers of working Americans could no longer obtain health
insurance from their employers, and the cost of private insurance was rising
so rapidly that scholars feared a “death spiral” undermining the system. 386
Over time, however, the principle underlying the ACA has become the
right of access to health care itself. 387 In January 2020, a majority of the
country (56%) favored a national Medicare-for-all health plan and two-thirds
of the public (68%) supported a government-administered “public option.” 388
A larger government role has become more palatable, and the principle of
universal access has become even more widely accepted. 389
The litigation over the ACA has been long and complicated, but the Act
has been easiest to defend where its principles have been articulated most
unequivocally and where its benefits have been most universally available. 390
385. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v.
Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020).
386. Elizabeth A. Pendo, Book Review, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 117, 118 (2008) (reviewing SUSAN
STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN AMERICA: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE
LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (2007)) (“The death spiral is a term used to describe the process by which
a pool of people covered by an insurance plan loses its relatively healthy members, causing costs
to increase for the remaining members. Unchecked, the spiral continues until the insurance plan
can no longer be sustained and ultimately ‘dies.’”).
387. After he left office, Obama observed, “We fought to make sure that in America, health
care is not just a privilege, but a right for every single American.” President Barack Obama,
Remarks by the President on the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/20/remarks-president-afford
able-care-act [https://perma.cc/L98K-BG8T].
388. Lunna Lopes, Liz Hamel, Audrey Kearney & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking
Poll–January 2020: Medicare-for-All, Public Option, Health Care Legislation and Court
Actions, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/pollfinding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2020/ [https://perma.cc/F5AD-C2MC]. In addition, the
public supported the ACA by a margin of 53% to 37%, a considerably higher ratio than during
the Obama Presidency. Id.
389. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1474 (observing that while the ACA originated
as a compromise incorporating market norms, “it has emerged from a decade of litigation much
more closely aligned with the norms of solidarity and universal coverage than it was in 2010”).
390. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012) (upholding the Act
as within congressional taxing power). Congress, however, later abolished the individual
mandate, and new cases are pending challenging the ACA on the ground that it is no longer a tax
and therefore no longer authorized by the taxing power. See Texas v. United States, 945 F.3d 355,
369 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. California v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020)
(No. 19-840), and cert. granted sub nom. Texas v. California, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (Mar. 2, 2020) (No.
19-1019).
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Implementation of the ACA depends on state-run insurance markets that
allow individuals to purchase policies from private insurers at subsidized
prices, expanded employer coverage, and state-administered Medicaid
expansion. 391 Each element of the program has different requirements, and
each has been subjected to extended attack. 392 On the other hand, more direct
federal provisions of health care benefits, such as Medicare-for-all or a public
option, might well be harder to challenge, legally and politically. 393
Cesar Ardon’s situation is an example of how the norm of universal access
to health care, now identified with the ACA, departs significantly from the
older system that tied benefits to the family wage regime. 394 The Secretary of
HHS, in approving the Arkansas work requirements that threatened Ardon’s
eligibility, observed that they would “encourage beneficiaries to obtain and
maintain employment or undertake other community engagement activities
that research has shown to be correlated with improved health and
wellness.” 395 While being employed may be correlated with better health
outcomes, taking away health insurance for failing to find work is a different
matter. 396 The D.C. Circuit, in striking down the requirements, held that: “The
text of the statute includes one primary purpose, which is providing health
care coverage without any restriction geared to healthy outcomes, financial
independence or transition to commercial coverage.” 397
In justifying its approval of exceptions to the program in Arkansas,
Kentucky, and elsewhere, the Trump administration argued that the threat of
sanctions was necessary to force people to work. 398 Yet, the D.C. Circuit
emphasized that such reasoning failed to take into account the loss of
coverage—“a matter of importance under the statute.” 399 The court record
showed that “in Arkansas, more than 18,000 people (about 25% of those
391. Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1475–76.
392. Id. at 1477–91 (summarizing the challenges).
393. Id. at 1492 (“It would be an ironic legacy for a law that began as a market-oriented
compromise, and then was challenged as government overreach, to pave the way toward
nationalization.”).
394. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
395. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Arkansas v.
Gresham, No. 20-38, 2020 WL 7086047 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2020); see Hammond, supra note 13.
396. HANNAH KATCH, JENNIFER WAGNER & AVIVA ARON-DINE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, TAKING MEDICAID COVERAGE AWAY FROM PEOPLE NOT MEETING WORK
REQUIREMENTS WILL REDUCE LOW-INCOME FAMILIES’ ACCESS TO CARE AND WORSEN HEALTH
OUTCOMES 16 (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-18health2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KTF9-QLK3].
397. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 102; see Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 530, 557
(characterizing the decision as a rejection of a “normative or moral retrenchment based on a new
narrative of deservingness”).
398. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 97.
399. Id. at 102.
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subject to the work requirement) lost coverage as a result of the project in just
five months.” 400 Research on work requirements in other programs generally
finds that they neither reduce poverty nor increase long-term employment. 401
Indeed, the causation may run in the opposite direction, with access to health
care positively related to an individual’s ability to work. 402 If Ardon has no
access to health care, he is also unlikely to be able to work. 403 Of course, the
critical point in the court’s opinion in rejecting the tie between work and
benefits is the concept of access to health care, and in that, the D.C. Circuit,
perhaps ironically, echoes Justice Alito’s opinion in Little Sisters by rejecting
the tie-in between work and benefits. 404
Gresham involved a matter of statutory construction. 405 Yet, the critical
issue in the lawsuit requires the willingness to interpret the ACA in terms of
a congressional intent to see access to health care as a matter of right that
serves as a precondition for employability rather than as a reward for
employment. 406 At a time when secure jobs are hard to come by and many
cannot afford gap measures such as COBRA, the design of the ACA
embraced the principle of universal access. 407 The D.C. Circuit decision
clearly interpreted the Act in such terms. 408 The challenge now lies with the
Supreme Court’s willingness to accept the clear statement of congressional
intent.
B. Objections to Uncoupling
Of course, uncoupling is not uncomplicated, and it raises pragmatic issues
of affordability and political feasibility. It also leads to more theoretical
questions of why government should bear the burdens. 409

400. Id. at 102–03.
401. KATCH ET AL., supra note 396, at 16.
402. Larisa Antonisse & Rachel Garfield, The Relationship Between Work and Health:
Findings
from
a
Literature
Review,
KAISER
FAM.
FOUND.
(Aug.
7,
2018), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-relationship-between-work-and-health-find
ings-from-a-literature-review/ [https://perma.cc/SK6G-58T2].
403. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
404. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 101–02.
405. See id. at 99–102.
406. Id. at 101–02.
407. Gluck et al., supra note 383, at 1492.
408. Gresham, 950 F.3d at 102.
409. See generally Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K.
Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020) (articulating the need for such a new
vision in legal scholarship).
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One objection is that, as articulated by the Obergefell dissent, marriage
remains a positive good that the state should promote for the benefit of
children. 410 Our response is, first, that the causality runs in the other direction;
it is the decline in security that undermines marriage, not the lack of marriage
that undermines family security. 411 Second, as the Supreme Court emphasized
in the seventies, conditioning benefits on marriage, when marriage is beyond
the reach of much of the population, is pointless and cruel. 412 That proverbial
ship has sailed.
A second objection, that work ensures productive citizens and provides
dignity and social meaning, is more difficult. That concept is the basis for
incentivizing labor market participation in TANF and other programs through
punitive means. 413 Others propose rebuilding security and stability through
redesigning work. The Earned Income Tax Credit, 414 which has the effect of
subsidizing low-income employment, is an example of this approach. 415 Uber
CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has called for the redesign of benefits to require
employer contributions to create a fund workers could use for the benefits
of their choice. 416 These work-centered approaches suffer, however, from
three principal limitations. First, they would have to ensure that
employment is universally available at a time when automation is
410. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 689 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
411. See discussion supra Part II; see also Douglas S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson,
Introduction: Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
6, 13 (2009) (observing that the debate over family change that started with the Moynihan Report
in the sixties involves the premise that “whenever males in any population subgroup lack
widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially rewarded status,
single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and children”).
412. See discussion supra Part III.A.
413. Perhaps the most remarkable insistence on cutting assistance in order to encourage
employment came from Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, who has insisted that Congress
should cut unemployment benefits by two-thirds during the COVID-19 pandemic because
otherwise recipients will not have an incentive to return to work. Mary Papenfuss, Study
Contradicts Steven Mnuchin Claim that Lazy Workers Choose Unemployment over Jobs,
HUFFPOST (Aug. 3, 2020, 7:46 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/mnuchin-unemploymentaid-work-study_n_5f276f92c5b656e9b09d3eac [https://perma.cc/LUA8-62GK].
414. Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533 (1995) (“The earned income tax credit (EITC),
which uses the federal income tax system to provide an earnings subsidy to low-income workers,
has enjoyed support across the political spectrum as a ‘pro-work, pro-family’ alternative to
traditional welfare programs.”).
415. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal
Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 460 (1997) (describing the tax credit as a subsidy).
416. Dara Khosrowshahi, Opinion, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig Workers Deserve Better,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/opinion/uber-ceo-darakhosrowshahi-gig-workers-deserve-better.html [https://perma.cc/BQ47-Q5HJ] (“I’m proposing
that gig economy companies be required to establish benefits funds which give workers cash that
they can use for the benefits they want, like health insurance or paid time off.”).
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reducing market demand for unskilled labor. 417 Second, the redesign would
have to cover not just getting the first job, but also the ability to switch to a
new job. 418 Third, if the program is invisible, Congress can abolish it. Social
Security is untouchable because older people identify so strongly with it.
This raises a final objection: cost. Medicaid is expensive, and the ACA’s
expansion of Medicaid increased costs by about 14%. 419 The existing
American health care system, however, which is the most expensive in the
world, does not deliver health care benefits commensurate with its costs. 420
Changing the system so that money is spent more efficiently would not
necessarily increase costs. 421
Still, reestablishing a comprehensive system of family security and
stability requires reconsideration of political support for government
spending. 422 The ACA, for example, has proven to be surprisingly resilient,
generating not just support for the ACA itself, but also for the principle of
universal coverage. 423
On the jurisprudential question of whether uncoupling calls for a new
relationship between individual and state rather than trying to recreate the
prior marriage–work–benefits partnership, the short answer is that there is no
other real choice. Marriage is no longer universal; employment is no longer
universal. Work-based solutions work only when they can reset labor
markets, which requires the kind of active state role that existed in the era
following World War II. Moreover, as the new political economy movement
417. For discussion of the idea of a “job guarantee,” see infra notes 439–442 and
accompanying text.
418. The issue of impermanent employment also complicates efforts to strengthen unions.
While we believe a revigorated union movement would help change the political calculus, we
believe that unions would have to become more independent of individual employers to work in
an uncoupled environment. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 9 (2004).
FAM.
FOUND.,
419. Medicaid
Expansion
Spending,
KAISER
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-expansion-spending/ [https://perma.cc/
7GZW-SFE6].
420. Erin Albert, Note, The Case for Pharmacists as Legal Health Care Providers, 9 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 187, 188 (2012) (“[T]he World Health Organization’s rankings of
global health care systems [places] the U.S. health care system [as] thirty-seventh overall in
terms of performance, while at the same time, it also is the most expensive health care system in
the entire world.”).
421. See Christopher Cai et al., Projected Costs of Single-Payer Healthcare Financing in the
United States: A Systematic Review of Economic Analyses, PLOS MED., Jan. 15, 2020, at 2–3,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6961869/ [https://perma.cc/42Q4-UMRR].
422. Indeed, some economists argue that the only real limit on federal spending is inflation;
whether for tax cuts or health, deficit spending is not an issue on its own. See STEPHANIE KELTON,
THE DEFICIT MYTH: MODERN MONETARY THEORY AND THE BIRTH OF THE PEOPLE’S ECONOMY 9
(2020) (observing that “the most important constraint on government spending is inflation.”).
423. See Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13, at 498.
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in the law suggests, calling attention to issues of power and distribution
provides a critical step in seeing legal developments as the product of political
forces, not as the neutral or inevitable response to market forces. 424
CONCLUSION
This Article focuses attention on how the legal structures supporting
family security have become decoupled from marriage and employment.
Understanding the ways in which the family wage system developed from
the structure of industrial-era employment leads to the conclusion that the
information age will inevitably require a new model to deliver a basic level
of family security. 425 Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that corporations no longer need to take responsibility for their employees
and that the meaning of marriage has changed. It has even provided a few
signposts for how, in the absence of long-term employment or stable
relationships, individual security might still be protected.
The dominant political view over the last several decades has nonetheless
been a neoliberal one, in which the state’s primary goal has been to support
the “free market[ ], rather than regulating to promote public goods” like
economic or social justice. 426 This neoliberal philosophy is similar to the
laissez-faire beliefs that generated wholesale opposition to labor market
regulation during the Lochner era. 427 It has similarly inspired entrenched
opposition today to the ACA’s premise that the government should ensure
universal access to health care. 428 Within this view, Cesar Ardon’s first
priority ought to be his own financial independence, with the loss of health
care benefits as the penalty for his inability to do so. 429 In this story,
individuals are responsible for their own well-being, and employment and
marriage are treated as the universally available private mechanisms for
securing family stability. 430
424. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 409, at 1784 (calling for legal scholarship to center
“themes of power, equality, and democracy”).
425. See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 261 (2018) (noting the need to protect workers without encouraging
employers to automate).
426. Eichner, supra note 78, at 218 n.21.
427. Id. (stating that neoliberalism “resuscitates much of classical liberal economics that
supports laissez-faire regulation of the market”).
428. See generally Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 13 (summarizing legal and political
opposition to the ACA). And, of course, the litigation remains ongoing. See discussion of Texas
v. United States, supra note 390.
429. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
430. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
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An alternative vision maintains that family security and stability come
from a societal design that complements the principal form of economic
organization and that addresses the inevitable instability that arises from the
economic system itself. 431 This view has historical resonance, as this Article
shows: once wage labor replaced farm ownership as the primary source of
family support, a larger government role became the only way to maintain a
comparable level of family stability.432 This vision, in which the state has an
obligation to ensure family security and stability, builds on Justice Alito’s
prescription for how to provide medical insurance that covers contraception;
in a world in which employers enjoy much greater freedom to design
employment to meet their individual ends, 433 only direct government
provision to individual employees can give them the same flexibility. 434
Redesigning an alternative system of family security without either
marriage or long-term employment as a starting premise, however, will
require more than simply providing universal access to health care. Three
basic models already exist for the reconstruction of the citizen–state
relationship. 435 The first is based on an unconditional cash grant. 436 In
building on the jurisprudence of legal and economic scholars, former
Presidential candidate Andrew Yang termed it a “Freedom Dividend,” similar
to earlier proposals for a universal basic income. 437 It would be uncoupled
from both marriage and employment but structured in a way likely to generate
more jobs and more stable relationships. 438

431. See, e.g., KELTON, supra note 422, at 65 (arguing that the business cycle is inevitable in
capitalist economies); see also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing that responsibility
for children should be seen as a societal rather than a private obligation).
432. See supra Part I.A (describing minimal state role during the agrarian era in which farms
could meet the subsidence needs of their residents).
433. See supra notes 362–370 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court upheld
employers’ constitutional right to receive government benefits that conform to their individual
religious beliefs even if it means limiting their employees’ access to benefits).
434. See also Dixon & Suk, supra note 33, at 375 (“[M]any constitutional democracies . . .
are actively considering, and passing, measures to increase investments in education and training,
raise the minimum wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income . . . .”).
435. See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, The Architecture of a Basic Income,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 638 (2020) (stating that arguments for Universal Basic Income “derive
varying levels of support from at least three main ethical theories: welfarism, egalitarianism, and
libertarianism”).
436. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment
Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 971–72 (1999) (proposing universal cash grants).
437. See YANG, supra note 211, at 166.
438. Id. at 178 (describing empirical evidence that family income security results in children
more likely to be able to hold a job and enter into stable relationships as adults).
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The second is modern monetary theory’s proposal for a job guarantee. 439
The job guarantee would create a public employment program that would
ensure a job with a minimum wage and benefit package to anyone who
wanted to work. 440 The job guarantee is part of a macroeconomic policy
framework designed to produce full employment and offset the private
business cycle’s impact on unemployment. 441 The program would be
designed both to ensure that low-skill individuals could find employment and
to contribute to public infrastructure including care work. 442
The third, binary economics, is designed to give each adult a capital stake
in the U.S. economy. 443 The theory rests on the idea that capital ownership,
such as holding shares in corporations, should be more broadly dispersed, 444
and that the capital owners should therefore be able to share in the returns to
capital. 445
Each proposal involves the redesign of a system of family security and
stability uncoupled from marriage and employment. With the Supreme
Court’s redefinition of marriage in terms of individual self-expression, the
severing of the civic obligations of corporate owners, and the undermining of
the federal–state–private compacts that once secured individual benefits, an
alternative system must grapple with just what form uncoupling should take
to respond to the challenges of contemporary inequality.
Ultimately, the more basic issue involves the terms on which the
government can extend a basic right to security and stability to all Americans,
that is, how to design a new state-administered regime that complements the
information age by uncoupling family security and stability from marriage
439. For an explanation of modern monetary theory, see Rohan Grey, Money Isn’t Scarce—
It’s Infinite, 37 LAW & INEQ. 132 (2019); cf. Heather Boushey, The Left Should Resist the Siren
Song of ‘Modern Monetary Theory,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2019, 9:25 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-left-should-resist-the-siren-song-of-modernmonetary-theory/2019/04/19/37e92190-5b9b-11e9-b8e3-b03311fbbbfe_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/T74D-HFQM].
440. KELTON, supra note 422, at 63–64.
441. Bill Mitchell, What Is a Job Guarantee?, BILL MITCHELL—MOD. MONETARY THEORY
BLOG (May 5, 2013), http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=23719 [https://perma.cc/BV9ARBCR].
442. KELTON, supra note 422, at 64.
443. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 3 (1999)
(proposing that each American receive a “stake” of $80,000 at maturity and attributing the concept
to Thomas Paine).
444. See, e.g., Robert Ashford, Using Socio-Economics and Binary Economics To Serve the
Interests of Poor and Working People: What Critical Scholars Can Do To Help, 8 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 173, 202 (2009) (describing the role of “the distribution of capital acquisition and
ownership and its crucial relation to wealth maximization, economic prosperity, and justice for
all people”).
445. Id. at 218–19 (describing proposal to expand capital ownership).
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and from employment. 446 By limiting family security to those “deserving” of
it, whether based on marriage or work, the existing system is premised on
outmoded and exclusionary assumptions about the appropriate relationship
between individual and state. As a legal, social, and cultural matter, family
security and stability are important, but, with the dynamic and systemic
dismantling of the old system that tied that stability to employment and to
marriage, only a new system can address these issues. In exploring how the
relationship between individual and state might be reconceptualized, this
Article offers guidance on the first jurisprudential steps towards a redesign of
the state–citizen compact.

446. See, e.g., Khiara M. Bridges, White Privilege and White Disadvantage, 105 VA. L. REV.
449, 473 (2019) (exploring the historical invisibility of non-white people in the social safety net);
Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court, 128 YALE L.J. 1478, 1537 (2018)
(discussing the broader social context for welfare claims).

